University of Chicago Law School

Chicago Unbound
Journal Articles

Faculty Scholarship

1968

Oligopoly and the Antitrust Laws: A Suggested Approach
Richard A. Posner

Follow this and additional works at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/journal_articles
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Richard A. Posner, "Oligopoly and the Antitrust Laws: A Suggested Approach," 21 Stanford Law Review
1562 (1968).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Chicago Unbound. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Journal Articles by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more
information, please contact unbound@law.uchicago.edu.

Oligopoly and the Antitrust Laws:
A Suggested Approach
Richard A. Posner*
This Article proposes for consideration a new approach' to a persistent
and difficult problem of antitrust policy. The problem is: What rules and
remedies are necessary to prevent supracompetitive prices in oligopolies,
markets in which a few sellers account for most of the output? The heart
of the suggested approach is a questioning of the prevailing view that monopoly pricing by oligopolists, when unaccompanied by any detectable acts
of collusion, constitutes an economically and legally distinct problem requiring new doctrines and new remedies for its solution. The interdependence theory of oligopoly that underlies this view, in treating explicit and
tacit collusion dichotomously, has obscured the similarities between the two
kinds of anticompetitive behavior. I shall argue that both forms of collusion can be proceeded against under section i of the Sherman Ac 2 as conspiracies in restraint of trade. The employment of section i against purely
tacit collusion would do no violence to the statutory language or purpose;
and while difficult problems of proof and of remedy would be involved,
I am not convinced that they would be insuperable.
Part I of the Article summarizes the prevailing view in the economic
and legal literature as to the distinctive character of the problem of oligopoly and notes the proposals to which this view has given rise; the focus
is on the writings of Donald Turner, a distinguished scholar and former
chief of the Antitrust Division. Part II explains my disagreement with
Professor Turner's approach to suggests a reformulation of the problem
of oligopoly that emphasizes the congruence between ordinary cartels,
routinely dealt with under section i of the Sherman Act, and the special
type of collusion that may arise under conditions of oligopoly. There are
a number of serious problems in applying the statute to nonexpress collusion: the problems of establishing the requisite degree of agreement, of
* A.B. 1959, Yale University; LL.B. 1962, Harvard University. Associate Professor of Law, Stanford University.
The suggested approach is a product of collaboration with Aaron Director, who, in addition, first
suggested many of the ideas that are developed in it. I am also greatly indebted to George J. Stigler.
I have drawn heavily not only on his published work in the field of industrial organization, but also
on ideas suggested by him in conversation and on his helpful comments on an earlier draft. I also wish
to thank the participants in the Industrial Organization Workshop of the University of Chicago, where
an earlier version of the piece was given, for their helpful suggestions.
i. For an older proposal having a family resemblance see Conant, Consciously ParallelAction in
Restraintof Trade, 38 MiNN. L. Rav. 797 (1954).
2. 15 U.S.C. § I (x964).
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proving to the degree of certainty required by the courts that the defendants have tacitly colluded, and of eliminating violations once they have
been proved; part III points out possible solutions to these problems. Part IV
extends the analysis to some other approaches to the oligopoly problem,
which differ from the section I approach in emphasizing the correction of
market structure rather than behavior. Considered are proposed legislation
that would authorize the dissolution of the leading firms in certain oligopolistic markets; a suggested interpretation of section 2 of the Sherman Acts
to forbid "oligopolizing"; and the recent Department of Justice Merger
Guidelines,4 which strictly limit mergers that increase concentration.
I. PROFESSOR TURNER ON THE INAPPLICABILITY OF SECTION I
OF THE S-ERmAN

ACT TO

OLiGOPOLSTIC INTERDEPENDENCE

The principal thesis of this Article is that section I of the Sherman Act,
which prohibits "[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or
otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade," is an appropriate weapon to
use against noncompetitive pricing in oligopolistic industries. That is not a
popular view, partly because it is erroneously5 thought to be foreclosed
by the famous dictum in Theatre Enterprises,Inc. v. ParamountFilm Distributing Corp. that "'conscious parallelism' has not yet read conspiracy
out of the Sherman Act entirely,"' and partly because it was forcefully
denounced in an article written by Donald Turner in x962.' That article
is a good place to begin discussion, although a rounded conception of Professor Turner's approach will require reference to some of his other writings as well.
At the heart of Turner's analysis is the theory of oligopolistic interdependence.8 The theory will be examined critically at a later point; for now,
a brief summary will suffice. In a market of many sellers the individual
seller is too small for his decisions on pricing and output to affect the market price. He can sell all that he can produce at the market price, and
nothing above it. He can shade the price without fear of retaliation because
the resulting expansion of his output at the expense of his rivals will divert
an imperceptible amount of business from each. For example, in a market
3. x5 U.S.C. § 2 (1964).
4. I TRADEREo.REt. 443o (1968).
5. See text accompanying notes 42-44 infra.
6. 346 U.S. 537, 541 (954).
7. Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman Act: Conscious Parallelism and Refusals To Deal, 75 HAuv. L. REv. 655 (x962).
8. See id. at 66o-66. The economic literature expounding the interdependence theory is voluminous. Some places to begin are E. CHAfBERLIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COmPETITION 30-55
(8th ed. 1962); W. FELLNER, COmPETIToN AMONG THE FEW 3-50, 175-83 (1949); and Kaysen, Collusion Under the Sherman Act, 65 Q.J. EcoN. 263 (195i). For a sense of the impression that the theory
has made on judicial thinking in the antitrust field see United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374
U.s.S32, 363 (1963).

HeinOnline -- 21 Stan. L. Rev. 1563 1968-1969

STANFORD LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 21: Page 1562

of ioo sellers of equal size, an expansion in output of 2o percent by one will
result in a fall of output of only about 0.2 percent for each of the others.
Under these conditions a seller will not worry about rivals' reactions in
making his pricing decisions.
In contrast, in a market where sellers are few, a price reduction that
produces a substantial expansion in the output of one will result in so
substantial a contraction in the output of the others that they will quickly
respond to the reduction. If, for example, there are three sellers of equal
size in a market, a 20 percent expansion in the output of one will cause
the output of each of the others to fall not by 0.2 percent but by io percent, a contraction the victims can hardly overlook. Anticipating a prompt
reaction by his rivals that will quickly nullify his gains, the seller in a
concentrated market will be less likely to initiate a price reduction than
his counterpart in the atomized market. Oligopolists are thus "interdependent" in their pricing. They base their pricing decisions in part on
anticipated reactions to them. The result is a tendency to avoid vigorous
price competition.
Professor Turner asks whether oligopolistic interdependence should be
viewed as a form of agreement to fix prices that violates section i of the
Sherman Act. The question has two parts: Is interdependence agreement?
If so is it unlawful agreement? Turner is prepared to allow that, "[c]onsidered purely as a problem in linguistic definition," interdependent pricing could be deemed a type of collusion.' But to him a more important
consideration is that "the rational oligopolist is behaving in exactly the
same way as is the rational seller in a competitively structured industry;
he is simply taking another factor into account'
(the reactions of his
rivals to any price cut) "which he has to take into account because the
situation in which he finds himself puts it there."" Since the oligopolist
is behaving just like the seller in an atomized market, oligopoly pricing
can be described as "rational individual decision in the light of relevant
economic facts" as well as it can be described as collusion."
Turner's decisive argument is that there is no effective remedy, fairly
to be implied from section i, against oligopolistic interdependence. An in-

junction that merely "prohibited each defendant from taking into account
the probable price decisions of his competitors in determining his own
price or output" would "demand such irrational behavior that full compliance would be virtually impossible."' 8 To be effective, the injunction

would have to require that the defendants reduce price to marginal cost,
and the enforcement of such a decree would involve the courts in a public9.Turner, supra note 7,at 665.
io.Id.at 665-66.
i. Id. at 666.
12. Id.
13. Id.at 669.
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utility type of rate regulation for which they are ill equipped1 Dissolution
of the guilty firms would be inappropriate in a section i context because
to fall back on this remedy is virtually to concede that the finding of liability on

the ground of conspiracy is dubious at best. If effective and workable relief requires a radical structural reformation of the industry, this indicates that it was
the structural situation, not the behavior of the industry members, which was
fundamentally responsible for the unsatisfactory results.15

Oligopolistic interdependence, in short, is inherent in the structure of
certain markets. Only semantically can it be equated with collusive pricefixing, for it is unresponsive to the remedies appropriate in price-fixing
cases. How, then, to deal with the phenomenon? Professor Turner had
suggested an answer to the question in Antitrust Policy, a book written in
i 959 in collaboration with the distinguished economist Carl Kaysen: enact
legislation to condemn "unreasonable market power" and to authorize the
dissolution of firms found to possess it." If the earlier book is set alongside
the later article, however, the analysis is seen to be incomplete. Antitrust
Policy correctly points out that the Supreme Court has never ruled that oligopolistic interdependence is a violation of antitrust law. 7 But it is a big step
from this observation to the conclusion that new legislation is required to
deal with the problem. It is always open to persuade the Supreme Court
to revise its interpretation of existing law; and, to be realistic, it is much
easier to sell novel doctrine in the antitrust field to the Court than to the
Congress. (In fairness, it should be added that the Court's receptivity to
novel antitrust doctrine is more apparent today than it was in 1959.) The

Court would not even have to overrule a prior decision, for it has never been
called upon to decide the legality of oligopolistic interdependence. The
14. ld. at 670.
15. Id. at 671. A conception of oligopoly quite similar to Turner's is basic to one of the recommendations (see note 83 infra) of the recently released Report of the White House Task Force on
Antitrust Policy (July 5, 1968, mimeo.). As a succinct and lucid summary of the position that it is
my main purpose in this Article to question, the relevant passage from the report deserves to be quoted
in full: "[I]n markets with a very few firms effects equivalent to those of collusion may occur even
in the absence of collusion. In a market with numerous firms, each having a small share, no single
firm by its action alone can exert a significant influence over price and thus output will be carried to
the point where each seller's marginal cost equals the market price. This level of output is optimal
from the point of view of the economy as a whole.
"Under conditions of monopoly-with only a single seller in a market-the monopolist can increase his profits by restricting output and thus raising his price; accordingly, prices will tend to be
above, and output correspondingly below, the optimum point. In an oligopoly market--one in which
there is a small number of dominant sellers, each with a large market share--each must consider the
effect of his output on the total market and the probable reactions of the other sellers to his decisions;
the results of their combined decisions may approximate the profit-maximizing decisions of a monopolist. Not only does the small number of sellers facilitate agreement, but agreement in the ordinary
sense may be unnecessary. Thus, phrases such as 'price leadership' or 'administered pricing' often do
no more than describe behavior which is the inevitable result of structure. Under such conditions, it
does not suffice for antitrust law to attempt to reach anticompetitive behavior; it cannot order the
several firms to ignore each other's existence. The alternatives, other than accepting the undesirable
economic consequences, are either regulation of price (and other decisions) or improving the competitive structure of the market." Id. at 1-4 to I-5.
a6. See C.KAYSEN &D. TURNER, ANiTRusT POLICY 110-19, 266-72 (1959).
17. Id. at io6-o9.
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1962 article explained why Turner believed that section i was not a suitable vehicle for an attack on oligopoly, but that left open the possibility of
using section 2 of the Sherman Act (which forbids monopolization), as
had been urged years before by Eugene Rostow' In a very recent article
Turner has endorsed that approach, arguing that section 2 can and should
be interpreted to authorize the dissolution of leading firms in oligopolistic
industries'
In both Antitrust Policy and the Department of Justice Merger Guidelines, promulgated when he was chief of the Antitrust Division, Turner
supported as a prophylactic against oligopoly a strict policy, founded on
section 7 of the Clayton Act,2" of limiting horizontal mergers 1 Since mergers historically have been an important source of concentration, a strong
antimerger policy should do much to prevent new oligopolies from emerging and loosely oligopolistic industries from becoming tightly oligopolistic.
The extraordinary stringency of the Guidelines may reflect in part Turner's earlier expressed view that once a market has become highly concentrated there is little that can be done under existing law to prevent noncompetitive, interdependent pricing.
II. Op

OLIGOPOLY, CARTELs, AND TACIT COLLusIoN

A.
Professor Turner's analysis of the problem of oligopoly and his conclusion that section I of the Sherman Act is not an apt vehicle for its solution
depend critically on a theory of oligopoly behavior that, although widely
accepted, is unsatisfactory in important respects. The crux of the theory is
that sellers in a concentrated market will be reluctant to initiate price reductions because they know that, unlike in an atomized market, a reduction by one will have so large an impact on the sales of the others as to
force a prompt matching price reduction, wiping out the first seller's advantage and leaving everyone worse off than before.22 Among other deficiencies, this formulation conceals some crucial factual assumptions. One
is that there will be no appreciable time lag between the initial price cut
and the response. But there will be a lag if the price cut can be concealed or
i8. Rostow, The New Sherman Act: A Positive Instrument of Progress, 14 U. Cm. L. Rvv. 567
(1947). See also Rostow, Monopoly Under the Sherman Act: Power or Purpose?, 43 ILL. L. REv. 745
(1949); Levy, Some Thoughts on "Antitrust Policy" and the Antitrust Community, 45 ssrne. L. REv.
963 (i962).
29. Turner, The Scope of Antitrust and Other Economic Regulatory Policies, 820HARv. L. REv.
2207, I232 (1969).
2o. 25 U.S.C. § is (1964).

2x. See C. KAysEN &D. TURNER, supra note 26, at 132-33; Departinent of Justice Merger Guide-

lines, x TRAna REo. REP. 443o, at 6683-85 (x968).
22. I limit discussion of the effects of oligopoly in this Article to price competition. There are
those who believe that oligopolists are prone to forgo other types of rivalry as well, but the evidentiary
and theoretical underpinnings of this belief are as yet rudimentary. Cf. E. MANSFIELD, THE EcoNoMIcs
OF TcHNoLo~icAL CHANGE 215-17 (2968).
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if the other sellers are uncertain about the appropriate response and hesitate;
and if a lag does occur, the price cut may pay even though it will eventually
be matched. Similarly, if the other sellers cannot expand their output as
rapidly as the first to meet the greater demand at the lower price, the first
seller may improve his position even if the others meet his price reduction
immediately. Lags in adjusting output to price changes must be quite common. Otherwise any price cut by a seller would, unless promptly matched,
give him the whole market, regardless of the number of other sellers.
The interdependence theory also overstates the impact of one oligopo-

list's price reduction on the sales of the others. When a seller expands his
output by lowering his price, only part of the additional output consists of
sales diverted from his rivals. The rest consists of new sales to buyers who
bought less or none of the product at the higher price. Depending on the
elasticity of demand to price, then, much of the price cutter's new business
may come from outside the market rather than from rivals. That will
diminish the impact of the price cut upon them and so the likelihood of
their responding immediately. The impact will also be diminished if the
price cutter initially reduces price on only a portion of his output.
Moreover, the asserted distinction between atomized and concentrated
markets with respect to price competition depends on a seemingly artificial
convention. Different changes in output are compared, related only in
that each represents the same percentage of each seller's previous output.
It is true that if there are ioo sellers of equal size in a market having a
total output of iooo units and one increases his output by 2 units-2o percent-the effect on the remaining sellers will be slight. But were there
only three sellers in the market (each the same size) and one increased
his output by 2 units, the effect on his rivals would also be negligible, a
0.33 percent fall in output for each of them. To produce dramatic effects
under oligopoly, a much larger expansion of output by the price cutter
is required. Let the oligopolist in our example expand output by 20 percent
of his previous output (67 units) and, true enough, his rivals will be hit so
hard that they will want to respond. But if, on the other hand, the same
market were unconcentrated, and a seller (or several sellers) increased
output by 67 units, the remaining sellers would equally want to respond.
The theory must assume, then, both that an individual seller can expand
output by only a fraction of his previous output and that individual sellers
in an atomistic market, unlike their counterparts in concentrated markets, will lack the foresight to realize that a price cut by several of them
may have an aggregate impact on the remaining sellers so large as to
provoke a prompt matching response by those sellers. These may be broadly
correct assumptions, but they are more properly matters to be studied empirically than to be tacitly assumed.
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A further difficulty arises from the emphasis that the theory places
on price reductions. The supposed reluctance of oligopolists to reduce
prices is cause for concern only if there is reason to believe that their
prices are supracompetitive. The interdependence theory does not explain,
however, how oligopolistic sellers establish a supracompetitive price. To be
sure, if costs or demand in a market decline, a failure to reduce price may
have the effect of transforming a previously competitive price into a monopolistic one. But, given inflation, a supracompetitive price level normally
could not be maintained without occasional market-wide price increases.
How are these effected? The answer given by adherents of the interdependence theory is "price leadership." Consider an atomistic market in
which price is equal to cost (including in cost an allowance for a fair return
to the investors). As the result of a series of mergers, the market becomes
oligopolistic. One of the leading firms then raises its price. It knows that it
will be unable to maintain a supracompetitive price if its rivals do not
match the increase; but it relies (so the argument goes) on their having
the good sense to realize that all would be better off at the higher price, a
price that approaches what a single firm would charge if it had a monopoly
of the market.
This reasoning may be plausible; at the same time it undermines
the proposition that oligopolists will be reluctant to reduce prices. That
proposition depends on each oligopolist's reasoning that if his rivals match
his price reduction, everyone, himself included, will end up worse than
before, because they will be at a lower price level. But why will that unhappy result not be prevented on the way down by an appropriate exercise of price leadership? If, in consequence of the first seller's price reduction, the market price begins to criinible, one would expect either he or
another seller to raise price and the others to follow, restoring the previous price level. Anticipating this sequence, oligopolists should not hesitate to undertake price experiments. Each should reason: "If I reduce my
price, and the others do not follow, I will have increased my profits. If they
match my reduction, any lower price will soon turn unprofitable, but when
that happens I can restore my price to the original level, confident that the
others will follow." There is of course the danger that one of the others,
reasoning similarly, will not follow him back up, but will say to himself:
"If I raise my price more slowly than the others, I can increase my profits
at their expense; should they come back down to my price, it will be time
enough to raise my price then, and they will follow." If sellers reason thus,
price reductions may be a dangerous tactic after all. But, then, if such reasoning is common, it will be difficult for oligopolists to reach noncompetitive
price levels in the first place. Each will be reluctant to exercise price leader-
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ship knowing that the others will be tempted by the prospect of short-term
gains at his expense to lag in following.
Further discussion is unnecessary to indicate my doubts that the interdependence theory of oligopoly provides an adequate explanation as to why
prices in oligopolistic industries should exceed competitive levels. Nor need
we pause to consider whether, by introducing the objections raised above
as qualifications to the interdependence theory, it could be given a consistent and intelligible expression.23 The relationship between the level of concentration in a market and the probability that pricing in that market will
be noncompetitive can be elucidated in simpler and more fruitful terms
than interdependence: in terms of the theory of cartels. 4
B.
Let us return to our market of ioo sellers of equal size. Despite the
large number of firms in the market, they would be better off if the
market price were somewhere above their cost-ideally, at the level that a
single-firm monopolist of the market would price. It does not follow that
they will agree to fix prices or that if they do the price level will in fact
be altered significantly. Collusion is a rational and effective business strategy only if its returns exceed its costs. One of the factors that affects the
returns from collusion is the elasticity to price of the demand for the
market's product. If the demand is highly elastic the monopoly price will
lie close to the competitive price and collusion will yield only modest returns. Another important factor is the condition of entry. A supracompetitive price will attract new entrants. Unless there are barriers to entry, or at
least an appreciable time lag before a new firm can enter, the cartel will be
in jeopardy from the very start. If new entrants are not admitted to the
cartel the maintenance of a supracompetitive price will be impossible. If
they are admitted the monopoly profits will have to be spread more thinly.
There is the additional risk to be considered that, should the cartel eventually break down, the market will find itself with too many firms, leading
to ferocious competition and many failures. A third important factor (discussed below under the costs of enforcing collusive agreements) relevant to
the returns from collusion is whether and how long widespread cheating
can be prevented.
23. Competent expressions of the interdependence theory do qualify the simple view that I have
been criticizing (see especially J. BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 304-48 (2d ed. 1968) ), although
not, in my opinion, adequately.
24. For good discussions of cartel theory see J. BAIn, PRIcE THEORY 283-97 (1952); D. DEwEY,
MONOPOLY IN ECONOMICS AND LAW 7-24 (2959); G. STIGLER, THE THEORY oF PRCaE 230-38 ( 3 d ed.
2966); McGee, Ocean Freight Rate Conferences and the American Merchant Marine, 27 U. CI. L.
Rav. x91 (296o); Patinkin, Multiple-PlantFirms, Cartels, and Imperfect Competition, 61 Q.J. EcoN.
173 (947). For some case studies see L. MARLNo, THE ALxumlmt CARTEL (1947); G. STocKxING, THE
PoTAsH INDusTRY (1931). The treatment of oligopolistic pricing as a form of cartelization is implicit
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The costs of collusion have two main components: coordination costs
and enforcement costs.5 Like any agreement, a price-fixing agreement requires bargaining among the parties, and bargaining is not costless. Moreover, once the initial price is fixed there must be a mechanism for changing
it to adapt to changed conditions of cost and demand. Coordination costs
are affected by the number of sellers whose actions must be coordinated
and by differences in costs, product, and judgment among the sellers.
Once the agreement is in force, the parties must have effective means
of assuring adherence to it. A price-fixing agreement raises acute problems
of enforcement because each seller, by shading the agreed price, can increase
his share of the monopoly profits. One might wonder why any seller would
be so foolish and short-sighted as to cheat when he must know that cheating will lead to the breakdown of the cartel. Without assuming that any
sellers are stupid, one can suggest a number of plausible reasons for expecting cheating to occur. A seller might cheat inadvertently, because of a
mistake in computation or a failure of communication of the agreed price.
He might have reason to believe that he could get away with cheating for
quite a while and that his additional profits during that period would adequately compensate for the profits he would lose as a result of the eventual
collapse of the agreement. He might cheat because he suspected that others
were cheating. Or, a related point, he might cheat because he lacked confidence that the cartel would endure and saw no advantage in forgoing
short-term gains for long-term gains unlikely to be realized. There is no
a priori reason why sellers should yield to the various temptations to cheat,
but there is abundant evidence that they commonly do. 8 To control cheating effectively, parties to price-fixing agreements may have to create elaborate machinery for the prevention, detection, and punishment of cheatersjoint sales agencies, systems for reporting transaction prices, penalties for
cheating, and so forth. Such machinery is not costless, however, and in
markets governed by the Sherman Act the most effective methods of
achieving compliance with price-fixing agreements, such as joint sales
agencies and legally enforced penalties for violations, are out of the question because they are illegal and cannot be concealed. The clandestine
methods of enforcing cartels are much less effective.
in G. STIGLER, supra at 219-2o, and in Stigler, A Theory of Oligopoly, 72 J. POL. ECON. 44 (1964),
reprinted in G. STIGLER, THE ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRY 39 (x968).
25. Another category, which will not be discussed, consists of the costs of negotiating with, or
repelling, new entrants. These can be viewed as enforcement costs.
26. See, e.g., P. MAcAvoY, THE EcoNomic EFFECTS OF REGULATION: THE TtuNx-LINE RAILROAD
CARTELS AND THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION BEFORE 2900 (x965), recounting the constant
cheating that plagued the railroad cartels at a time when the Sherman Act prohibition against cartels

had not yet crystallized. On the instability even of fully enforceable cartel agreements see Voigt, German Experience With Cartels and Their Control During the Pre-War and Post-War Periods, in ColsPETITION, CARTELS AND THEIR REGULATION 169 (J. Miller ed. x962). And for a contemporary example
of recurrent cheating by members of a price-fixing scheme see Smith, The Incredible Electrical Conspiracy, FORTUNE, Apr. x962, at 232, 170.
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The point to be emphasized is that the attractiveness and feasibility of
a price-fixing scheme to the sellers in a market are limited by the costs of
bargaining to agreement and of enforcing the agreement to prevent cheating. And one way to view the price-fixing prohibition of section i of the
Sherman Act is as a device for increasing the costs involved in establishing
and maintaining noncompetitive prices. It is in this light that the relevance
of oligopoly to pricing behavior emerges most clearly.27 The analysis of bargaining and enforcement costs in other contexts indicates that they tend
to rise sharply with the number of parties whose actions must be coordinated for a desired arrangement to emerge!' This experience can be transferred to the price-fixing context. In a market of many sellers the problems
of bargaining to a mutually agreeable price and of preventing cheating are
formidable. Substantial unanimity is necessary to a successful price-fixing
scheme, and the larger a group the more difficult and costly it will be to
achieve. In a market of many sellers there will be many points of view,
some extremely recalcitrant individuals, many potential cheaters, and a vast
number of transactions in which cheating could occur. The problems of
obtaining and enforcing agreement become magnified to a point where
a formal and elaborate machinery of coordination and implementation is
bound to be necessary. But section i of the Sherman Act limits the parties to
clandestine methods. It seems unlikely, in these circumstances, that pricefixing agreements will flourish in markets that have very many sellers."
Oligopoly thus emerges as a necessary condition (in most cases) of
successful price-fixing where the Sherman Act is applicable; that is the
first implication of the analysis. But, equally important, it is not a sufficient condition. Much more is necessary to the disappearance of competitive pricing than the bare fact that there are only a few sellers in the
market. To begin with, just as in the atomistic market, each seller must
make a deliberate choice not to expand output to the point where the cost
of the last unit of output equals the market price, or, if he is at that point,
to reduce output. There is a real choice here. It is not irrational for an
oligopolist to decide to set a price that approximates marginal cost. It is
not an unprofitable point at which to sell (so long as cost is defined to
27. In addition, however, the barriers to entry in a market of many sellers are likely to be trivial;
in an oligopolistic market that had formidable barriers to entry the attractiveness of collusion would,
other things being equal, be much greater. Another relationship between oligopoly and pricing is
discussed in text following note 37 infra.
28. See, e.g., Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. EcoN. REV. PAPERS & PROCEEDINGS 347 (1967).
29. A recent study of criminal prosecutions under the antitrust laws (mostly price-fixing cases)
found as much enforcement activity in relatively unconcentrated as in highly concentrated industries.
See J. CLABAULT & J. BURTON, SHERmAN ACT INDICTMENTS 19 5 5 -i965-A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS 128-44 (1966). However, the industry classifications employed are crude and in many instances do not describe relevant markets; the study contains no data from which one could infer how
successful the efforts at price-fixing in the unconcentrated industries were; and, most important, the
study provides no basis for estimating the amount of effectively concealed price-fixing in highly concentrated industries, where concealment should be more practicable.
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include a sufficient profit to make production attractive to investors), and it
may have definite attractions: if the oligopolist finds speculation about the
probable reactions of his rivals as inconclusive as suggested in the earlier
discussion of interdependence; if he believes that new entry or the competition of substitute products will prevent him from obtaining appreciable
monopoly profits; if he distrusts his competitors and fears that any higher
price would quickly be eroded by cheaters, placing him at a temporary
disadvantage if he did not cheat; or if restricting output would lay him
open to heavy punishment (more on that later) 3o
If each oligopolist in a particular market should decide to go for the
approximate joint maximizing price, the problems of coordination and
enforcement must still be faced. The sellers must have some method of
getting to the maximizing price and, once arrived, of altering price as
conditions of cost and demand change. There are several possibilities:
actually meet together and decide on a price; each publicly announce what
he thinks the right price is and why, and gradually all converge on a mutually acceptable price; or by express or tacit understanding designate one
seller as the price leader whose moves the others will follow, relying on
his judgment of market conditions. If the oligopolists have different costs
or different judgments about demand conditions (including the effect
of a higher price on entry), finding a mutually agreeable price may be
impossible without (or even with) actual negotiation. If, moreover, freight,
extras, quality differences, or other factors that produce deviations from a
single basic price are common, causing transaction prices to vary, the sellers
must arrive at an understanding on how these items will be computed.
Otherwise they will be unable to determine when the agreed price is
actually being charged or precisely what prices they should charge on the
basis of the observed transaction prices of the price leader. Alternatively,
the parties can attempt to standardize the product, but that will often be
a highly unprofitable course of action. 1 Further, there must be adequate
dissemination of the agreed price and of any price change lest the followers
be caught by surprise by the leader's pricing changes or fail altogether to
match them. Even when sellers are few, then, coordination is not a simple
or costless process.
Nor does the condition of fewness eliminate the problem of cheating.
Each seller has the same temptation to cheat as in a market of many sellers.
Because of the constraints of the Sherman Act, colluding sellers cannot
punish cheaters (at least not without compounding their antitrust violations). Probably the best they can do in most cases is to try to make cheating difficult to conceal, in the hope that its incidence will be reduced if the
30. See part III-C infra.
31. See Stigler, A Theory of Oligopoly, 72 J. PoL. Eco N. 44 (1964), reprintedin G. STIGLER, THEs
ORGANIZATION OF INDusTRY

39 (1968).
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gains are short-lived. But that is hard to do. The most efficacious means by
which competitors can eliminate uncertainty as to each other's transaction
prices, such as by an exchange of the terms of specific sales, have been
condemned32 and are difficult to implement covertly. Nor are these methods, even when practical, always effective. There is no assurance that the
sellers will report their transaction prices accurately; the absence of any
legal sanctions makes this an inviting area for fraud. Sellers may also find
it possible, without fraud, to conceal price cutting through the practice of
reciprocal buying. Critics of the practice tend to overlook the fact that it is
an effective method of secret price cutting. Seller X sells product A to seller
Y at list price, but then buys from Y product B on terms more favorable
to Y than Y could command ordinarily. In effect, X is granting Y a discount
on A, but in so roundabout a fashion that X's competitors are unlikely to
learn what is going on.
Short of direct knowledge of competitors' transaction prices, the most
reliable method of determining whether the competition is cheating is by
consulting one's own sales experience." The fact that a seller's market share
is declining while he is maintaining the agreed price may indicate cheating
by others. But in many cases it will be an ambiguous indication. If the
product is not a standard one the loss of sales may be the result of nonprice
rather than price rivalry. If there are large buyers in the market a substantial contraction of market share may be the result of the defection of a
single buyer, and it will be difficult to determine whether his defection
represents an isolated piece of bad luck or was the result of price cutting.
(One can of course ask the buyer why he switched, but if he says that it
was because of a discount he may very well be lying in order to induce a
larger discount from the inquirer.) If demand is growing, so that many
sales are to buyers new to the market, it will be difficult for a seller to infer
cheating from the fact that he is not getting a proportionate share of the
new buyers; he has less reason to expect to attract any particular proportion of new buyers than to retain his old customers. The dilemma for the
seller who sees his market share declining is that if cheating is not the
cause he will be even worse off if he cuts price and thereby jeopardizes
the cartel.
In enumerating the problems of coordination and enforcement that
oligopolists bent on charging supracompetitive prices must overcome, I
do not mean to imply that they are never solved, although few price-fixing
conspiracies have come to light in which cheating was not rife and the
benefits to the conspirators were enduring. " What the discussion does
Most recently in United States v. Container Corp. of America, 393 U.S. 333 (1969).
33. See Stigler, supra note 31.
34. Admittedly, this is a biased sample. By definition, completely successful price-fixing conspirades never come to light. Still, the repeated breakdown of the electrical conspiracy, see Smith, supra
32.
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imply is, first, that oligopolists cannot be presumed always or often to charge
supracompetitive prices. Like atomistic sellers they must (with an exception shortly to be noted) collude in one fashion or another and the costs
of collusion will frequently exceed the returns. Second, it seems improbable that prices could long be maintained above cost in a market, even a
highly oligopolistic one, without some explicit acts of communication and
implementation. One can, to be sure, specify an extreme case in which
such acts might be unnecessary. No more than three sellers selling a completely standardized product to a multitude of buyers (none large) should
be able to maintain the joint maximizing price without explicit collusion.
However, not many industries resemble this model. More realistically, one
might be concerned that purely tacit collusion would be attempted sufficiently often in highly oligopolistic industries to raise the long-run average
price in those industries above the competitive level, even if collusion was
highly imperfect and the average price substantially below the joint maximizing price. It is also possible that such formal machinery as is used by
oligopolists to fix prices is often difficult to detect, at least with the certainty required in a legal proceeding and especially in a criminal one.
This is speculation. The theory of oligopoly advanced here, although
useful in identifying relevant criteria, is not refined to the point where one
can predict the markets in which price-fixing, with or without explicit (but
covert) acts of collusion, is likely to be found. We need to know much
more about the costs and returns of cartelizing than we do. Although a
number of cross-sectional statistical studies have found a correlation between profitability and concentration," the findings contain perplexing
features"6 and in many studies the correlation is weak. 7 More to the point,
assuming that the correlation is meaningful, we do not know whether or
in what proportions it reflects purely tacit collusion, or explicit collusion
successfully concealed, or perhaps other factors altogether.
One of the other factors that deserve specific mention is single-firm
monopoly. It would be an error to suppose that a firm must control its
market completely in order to have monopoly power. If a firm has a
note 26, is a significant illustration of the difficulty of fixing prices even when the market is oligopolistic
and the sellers establish elaborate collusive arrangements.
35. See Telser, Some Determinants of the Returns to Manufaituring Industries (Apr. 1969,
mimeo.); N. COLLINS & L. PRESTON, CONCENTRATION AND PRICE-COST MARGINS IN MANUFACTURING
INDUSTRIES (r968). The latter work contains a summary of earlier studies. id. at x8-5o.
36. See id. at rog; G. STIGLER, supra note 31, at 145-46. For example, the findings show a stronger
correlation between concentration and profitability when gross census industry classifications are used
than when more refined industry classifications are used, even though the latter are likelier to approximate relevant markets rather than purely arbitrary groupings.
37. See G. STIGLER, supra note 31, at 145 n.5. As Professor Stigler notes, "not more than one-half,
and often less than one-fifth, of the variance of rates of return among industries is accounted for by
differences in concentration." Id. at 145. It would be interesting to find out how much of the variation
in profitability between concentrated and nonconcentrated industries is accounted for by the single
most profitable firm in each of the concentrated industries. It is possible that the abnormal profits of
such industries are to a significant degree a result not of collusion or interdependence but of the unusual
efficiency-or, as explored in the next paragraph of text, market power--of one firm.
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very large market share and its competitors cannot expand their output
very rapidly, it may pay the firm to charge a supracompetitive price; its
market share will erode, but only gradually. Nor is it always necessary that
the firm have an overwhelming share of the market. Consider a market
of two firms, each with a 50 percent market share. If marginal cost in that
market rises with output, one firm can raise its price above its marginal
cost secure in the knowledge that the competitor cannot take away its
business by remaining at the former price; the competitor cannot supply
additional output at that price. Although this is a case where price can rise
above marginal cost without any element of cooperation between the sellers
in a market, it can be viewed as a subcategory of the single-firm monopoly
situation. Monopoly signifies the power to increase price above the competitive level without immediately losing one's entire trade to rivals; the
two-firm example given above fits that definition. If the case has any
counterparts in the real world they would be governed by the discussion
later in this Article of appropriate antitrust policies toward single-firm
monopolies.38
III. SEcTiON I AND TAcrr COLLUSION

To summarize the discussion at this point, the conventional formulation of the oligopoly problem, which holds that oligopolists are interdependent as to price and output, is inadequate. With the exception just
noted, voluntary actions by the sellers are necessary to translate the bare
condition of an oligopoly market into a situation of noncompetitive pricing. Perhaps in an extreme case no explicit acts of collusion or enforcement
are necessary for this translation, only a tacit understanding on restricting
output, and perhaps in a larger number of cases explicit acts are necessary
but completely concealable. There is no need to distinguish these categories.
Both can be considered forms of tacit collusion (or, synonymously, noncompetitive pricing by oligopolists), since that is how they would appear
to a trier of fact. The essential point, in any event, is that tacit collusion
thus defined is very like express collusion.
The major implication of viewing noncompetitive pricing by oligopolists as a form of collusion is that section I of the Sherman Act emerges
as prima facie the appropriate remedy. There is, as we have seen, no vital
difference between formal cartels and tacit collusive arrangements; the
latter are simply easier to conceal. The purpose of section I is to deter col-

lusion by increasing its costs; this suggests that the tacit colluder should
be punished like the express colluder. And tacit collusion is voluntary behavior, which should be deterrable by appropriate punishment.
38. See text accompanying notes 93-95 infra. The example given in the text is one version of the
Edgeworth duopoly model. See F. MAcmu', THE EcoNomics oF SELLERS' COM-ETn7ON 382 n.13
(952).
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These propositions will now be tested through an examination of the
three major problems that the proposed employment of section i raises:
an interpretive problem, of satisfying the jurisdictional requirement of
section i that there be concerted action; an evidentiary problem, of proving
collusion to the satisfaction of a court in a case where acts of collusion
cannot be shown; and a remedial problem, of preventing violations of the
suggested new rule.
A. The Problem of ConcertedAction
Since section i reaches only concerted activity-activity arising from
a "contract, combination . .. , or conspiracy"--we must decide whether

noncompetitive pricing by oligopolists can fairly be so classified when
there is no proof that the oligopolists directly communicated with one
another or took steps to enforce an understanding. The question will be
considered at three levels: the level of semantics, the level of judicial precedent, and the level of statutory purpose.
The dictionary is no longer a fashionable aid to statutory interpretation,
and for good reason: Context is vitally important. Nonetheless, an attempt
to torture statutory language very far from accepted meanings does place
the burden of explanation on the proponent of the interpretation. There
is no distortion of accepted meanings, however, in viewing what I have
termed tacit collusion as a form of concerted rather than unilateral activity.
If seller A restricts his output in the expectation that B will do likewise,
and B restricts his output in a like expectation, there is quite literally a
meeting of the minds or mutual understanding even if there is no overt
communication. In forbearing to seek short-term gains at each other's
expense in order to reap monopoly benefits that only such mutual forbearance will allow, they are much like the parties to a "unilateral contract,"
which is treated by the law as a contract rather than as individual behavior.
If someone advertises in a newspaper that he will pay $io to the person who
finds and returns his dog, anyone who meets the condition has an enforceable claim against him for the promised reward. The finder's action in
complying with the specified condition is all the indication of assent that
the law requires for a binding contract. Tacit collusion by oligopolists is at
least analogous. A seller communicates his "offer" by restricting output,
and the offer is "accepted" by the actions of his rivals in restricting their
outputs as well.39
39. The proposition that a belief in mental telepathy is not necessary to allow one to conclude
that there may be a "meeting of the minds" without verbal interchanges has been illuminated by game
theorists. The oligopoly "game" is an example of games "in which, though the element of conflict
provides the dramatic interest, mutual dependence is part of the logical structure and demands some
kind of collaboration or mutual accommodation-tacit, if not explicit-even if only in the avoidance
of mutual disaster. These are also games in which, though secrecy may play a strategic role, there is
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This analysis might well commend itself to the Supreme Court, which
has frequently declared that section i does not require proof of express
collusion." None of the cases containing such declarations, to be sure, is
quite like what is suggested here. In Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United
States,4 3 a motion-picture exhibitor sent an identical letter to competing
distributors asking them to maintain a certain minimum admission price
on subsequent runs of their pictures. There was no evidence that the distributors ever communicated with one another with reference to this letter.
Nonetheless, the Court upheld the finding that in observing the minimum
price specified in the letter the distributors had engaged in a price-fixing
conspiracy. Despite the absence of any overt communication, there had
been a meeting of minds on the price to be charged and mutual forbearance
to undercut the price; and this was deemed sufficient agreement or concert
of action to satisfy the requirement of the statute. Unlike a pure case of
tacit collusion, an agreement involving some actual communication among
the distributors could in fact have been inferred from the evidence. But
the Court's formulation of the elements of a section i conspiracy is easily
broad enough to encompass oligopolists who are able without any overt
communication to raise price and restrict output in anticipation that each
will perceive the advantage of that course of action and adhere to it.
Nor was this formulation superseded by the dictum in the Theatre
Enterprises opinion, quoted earlier, that "'conscious parallelism' has not
yet read conspiracy out of the Sherman Act entirely."42 As Professor Turner has pointed out, that was a case where the behavior of the rival firms
was found to be consistent with an inference of perfectly independent pricing." For reasons to appear shortly," I prefer to illustrate the principle
by a different set of facts. Suppose that there is a rise in the price of a raw
material used in fabricating widgets. It would not be surprising if this led
to a rise in the market price of widgets. If so, not only would every producer have raised his price, but each would know that the others had raised
some essential need for the signaling of intentions and the meeting of minds ...
"... Whenever the communication structure [or the legal structure, one might add) does not
permit players to divide the task ahead of time according to an explicit plan, it may not be easy to
coordinate behavior in the course of the game. Players have to understand each other, to discover patterns of individual behavior that make each player's actions predictable to the other; they have to test
each other for a shared sense of pattern or regularity .. . . They must communicate by hint and by
suggestive behavior. Two vehicles trying to avoid collision, two people dancing together to unfamiliar
music, or members of a guerrilla force that become separated in combat have to concert their intentions
in this fashion, as do the applauding members of a concert audience, who must at some point 'agree'
on whether to press for an encore or taper off together." T. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY oF CONFLI-r
83-85 (Ig6o).
40. See, e.g., United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 142 (948); United States
v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 275-76 (1942); Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208,
226-27 (939); Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers' Aas'n v. United States, 234 U.S. 6oo, 6x2 (1914).
41. 306 U.S. 208 (1939).
42. See note 6 supra.
43. Turner, supranote 7, at 658.
44. See text following note 57 infra.
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their price. In this sense, their collective action in raising the price of
widgets would be "consciously parallel." But no inference that the price
rise was the result of an understanding to move from a competitive to a
monopolistic price by contracting output could be drawn. One might, if he
liked, say that the widget producers had acted in concert or even by agreement. But there was no agreement in restraint of trade, no interference
with market forces. That is the essential teaching of Theatre Enterprises.
The suggested approach, finally, is consistent with the purposes of section x. The statute is addressed to concerted activity because the evil
against which the framers were legislating was the banding together of
rivals, as in cartels or trusts, to extract monopoly profits by agreeing to end
competition and charge the joint maximizing price." Tacit collusion by
oligopolists has the same character. It is a concert of firms for the purpose
of charging monopoly prices and extracting monopoly profits.
Professor Rahl has argued that the requirement of proving actual agreement must be retained because the Sherman Act is a penal statute. 6 His argument is not that its penal character precludes a flexible interpretationit is much too late in the day to make that argument about the Sherman
Act-but that to dispense with the requirement of proving actual agreement would be "to imply criminality generally as to large enterprise in
' This assumes, however, that noncompetitive pricing follows
America."47
automatically from the condition of being an oligopolist, an assumption
I reject. As explained earlier, tacit collusion or noncompetitive pricing is
not inherent in an oligopolistic market structure but, like conventional
cartelizing, requires additional, voluntary behavior by the sellers.
B. The Problem of Proof
The biggest problem in applying section i of the Sherman Act to tacit
collusion is that of proof: How can the existence of noncompetitive pricing
be established without any proof of acts of agreement, implementation, or
enforcement? Without denying that these will be extremely difficult cases,
one can point to several types of evidence that should convince the trier
of fact that sellers are guilty of tacit collusion as that term is used here.
The first is evidence that they practice systematic price discrimination.
By price discrimination I mean a pattern of selling in which the ratio of
price to marginal cost is not the same for all sales of a commodity.48 Dis45. Any doubt that one of the major evils against which section I was aimed was the loose-knit
combination or cartel is dispelled by Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J.
LAw & ECON. 7, 21-24 (1966).
46. See Rahl, Price Competition and the Price FixingRule-Preface and Perspective, 57 Nw. U.L.
RV. 137, 147 (x962).

47. Id.
48. This is the economic definition of discrimination. It should be carefully distinguished from
the usual legal definition, i.e., any price"difference. See Clayton Act § 2(a), as amended, 55 U.S.C.
§ 13(a) (1964); FTC v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 363 U.S. 536,549 (ig6o).
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crimination in this sense cannot be systematically and persistently employed
in a competitive market; competition will prevent sellers from extracting
disproportionate returns in some transactions for long. Monopoly power is
necessary for persistent discrimination, and in a market that has more than
one major seller the usual source of such power is collusion, tacit or express.
If the Government can prove systematic price discrimination, an inference
of noncompetitive pricing should be drawn. One can object that such proof
is an unsatisfactory ground on which to establish tacit collusion because it
leaves the defendants free to continue colluding, save that they must fix a
single monopoly price rather than discriminate. This .point is valid to the
extent that it implies that the decree in such a case should not be limited to
abating the discrimination. The decree should forbid tacit collusion by any
means, thus laying a predicate for prompt and severe punishment" should 1
defendants comply only by ceasing to discriminate. But even if the decree
had no effect beyond termination of discrimination, the proceeding would
not have been wholly in vain. Discrimination enables a monopolist (or joint
monopolists, in our case) to increase the profits from monopoly. To prevent
discrimination by tacit colluders, therefore, is to reduce the returns to collusion and hence the incentive to engage in it.
One form of discrimination deserves separate attention. Because the
costs and difficulty of coordination and enforcement are increased if transaction prices in the market vary considerably at every moment as a result
of differences in freight, custom features, or other extras, colluding sellers
may find it advantageous to agree on a highly simplified pricing system.
Under such a system, prices will be discriminatorily uniform because they
will fail to reflect fully the different costs associated with different sales;
this will be additional evidence of collusion.
I do not suggest that proof of discrimination will present no problems.
There will frequently be problems of characterization. Consider the practice of resort hotels in charging different rates for the same accommodations, depending on the time of year. That ma seem a discriminatory practice, but it is not, at least in the sense used here, It is an example of peak-load
pricing, which is fully consistent with competition. " Another problem in
proving discrimination is that such proof requires a comparison of the
marginal costs of the different sales, and cost determinations are fraught
with practical and conceptual difficulties. But there is this saving grace:
There should be no need actually to determine the marginal cost of any
sale. It should be enough to determine the difference in marginal costs
attributable to the different circumstances of the sales that are compared,
and that should be a much easier task.
Another indication of noncompetitive pricing is a prolonged excess of
49. See notes 76-77 infra and accompanying text.
So. See Hirshieifer, Peak Loads and Efficient PDicing: Comment, 72 Q.J. EcON. 451 (958).
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capacity over demand. A movement from a competitive to a monopolistic
price involves a contraction of output. A single-firm monopolist will reduce its capacity to a level appropriate to the reduced level of output. But
because of the fragility of cartels, the members of a price-fixing conspiracy
-tacitly colluding oligopolists in our case-may not reduce their capacity
as their output contracts. They have no assurance that the reduced level of
output will persist. Each must be prepared, if the cartel breaks down, to
expand output promptly or lose position to its rivals.
Evidence of excess capacity is unlikely, however, to play a large role in
cases under the new standard. Proof of the condition is very difficult. Moreover, if a cartel does function successfully, the parties should eventually
be able to bring capacity into phase with their monopolistic level of output,
perhaps by agreeing on the rate at which they will change capacity. In such
a case there will be no evidence that present capacity is excess; any evidence
will relate to a much earlier period. Furthermore, there are other causes of
excess capacity besides noncompetitive pricing. The Government should
be required, therefore, to prove a prolonged, rather than merely transient,
condition of excess capacity, and defendants should be permitted to rebut
by showing that the condition had an innocent cause.
A potentially important class of evidence relates to changes in the market
price. In general, the prices of noncompeting sellers should change less frequently than the prices of competing firms. The difficulty involved in
arriving at a mutually agreeable price counsels for infrequent redeterminations; in addition, the opportunities to cheat are increased by frequent
market-price changes. One would also expect cost changes to affect the
market price proportionately less in a noncompetitive than in a competitive
market. To illustrate, if a widget costs io cents to produce (regardless of
quantity), under competition the price will be io cents. But suppose that,
by colluding, the sellers are able to raise the price to x6 cents. If the cost
of producing a widget now declines by 2 cents, the price will fall by 12.5
percent even if the sellers pass the entire cost reduction to the purchaser,
whereas if the market were at the competitive price the same cost reduction
would lead to a 20 percent price reduction. Moreover, colluding sellers will
in some cases be able to appropriate the greater part of any cost savings as
additional profit and pass less of the savings to the purchaser-reduce price
less-than would competing firms. "'
I am not suggesting that a direct comparison of costs between a competitive market and one suspected of being noncompetitive be attempted,
but only that in some cases it may be possible, by a comparison with pricing
51. This point may be illustrated graphically. In Figure i, a reduction in cost from MC to MC'
will lead to a reduction of the competitive price from Pc to Pc and of the monopoly price from Pm
to Pm'; as is evident, the monopoly price falls less, not only as a percentage of the former price but
absolutely.
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behavior in other markets, to infer collusive behavior from the lesser
frequency and smaller amplitude of price changes in the market under
scrutiny. Some words of caution are necessary here, however. First, a
technical point but an important one, the effect under discussion is certain
to occur only if the cost and demand functions of the firms are linear, and
they may not be. Second, the effect may be offset by the tendency under
monopoly to alter price more when demand shifts than would competitive
firms." Third, meaningful inferences can be drawn only from the actual
transaction prices in the market, which may be different from the list prices.
Rigid list prices do not prove collusion if transaction prices depart substanFIGMnE I
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52. Figure 2 illustrates this point. When demand shifts from dd to dd', the monopoly price falls
from Pm to Pm', a greater distance than from Pc to Pc'. I have assumed in the example that marginal
costs rise with output; if they are constant, as of course they may be in an actual case, price will not
fall at all under competition, although it will fall under monopoly.
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tially from list. The Government should be able to obtain representative
transaction prices from buyers. If this seems too onerous a burden to place
on the Government, the rule might be to permit the Government to base
inferences on list prices, while allowing defendants to rebut by showing
that many sales were not at list.
Two other kinds of evidence of tacit collusion that will require delicate handling are abnormal profits and price leadership. It would be a
mistake for courts to emulate public-utility commissions and attempt to
determine the reasonable or competitive price in a market where tacit
collusion was alleged. All other considerations aside, it would extend section i proceedings inordinately to undertake a valuation of the defendants'
assets and a thorough review of their costs-two fearfully complicated
and laborious steps in the determination of reasonable price. But there
may be some cases where price is so out of line with any reasonable estimate of capital and operating costs that persistent abnormal profits can
be demonstrated without a full public-utility type of inquiry and where
no inference other than collusion (such as persistent success at innovation) is possible. Evidence relating to profits should therefore not be ruled
out entirely. A nice question is whether defendants should be allowed to
rebut a showing of tacit collusion based on other evidence by proof that
they did not enjoy any monopoly profits. Since it is quite possible that
the members of a cartel, due to entry of new firms into the market, will
not have substantial monopoly profits at the monopoly price, the answer
should be no.
The problem with price leadership is not that it is difficult to establish
but that its significance is equivocal. It is true that colluding sellers may
find it necessary to agree on a price leader. On the other hand, price leadership may emerge in a market simply because one of the firms is thought
to have good judgment of market conditions and the others regularly defer
to it. Still, there may be some cases where price leadership is so uniform
and long-continued as to warrant an inference of tacit collusion.
Some of the more traditional methods of proving collusion circumstantially should also be useful in proving tacit collusion. One such method is by showing that the defendants have had fixed market shares for
a substantial period of time; another, that they filed identical sealed bids
on nonstandard items. Among other indicia of tacit collusion, I shall
mention in closing just three: refusal to offer discounts in the face of substantial excess capacity; the announcement of price increases far in advance, without legitimate business justification for so doing; and public
statements as to what a seller considers the right price for the industry
to maintain. When a seller has substantial excess capacity, the pressure
to cut prices is strong, because the cost of utilizing idle capacity will be
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only a fraction of the usual cost of production. For sellers in these circumstances to refuse to reduce price suggests collusion. The practices of announcing price increases long in advance, and of discussing publicly what
is the right price for the industry (not the individual firm), are methods
of indirect communication by which sellers iron out possible differences
among them and arrive at the mutually agreeable price. Evidence relating
to public discussion or announcements of price increases will usually not
be sufficient by itself, but together with evidence of the actual pricing of
the industry members could provide convincing support for an inference
of tacit collusion.
Clearly, the kinds of evidence that would be admissible in a tacit-collusion case cover a wide spectrum. These would inevitably be "big" cases. But
the scope of permissible inquiry would not be unlimited, and should not
be unmanageable. Unlike proceedings under Kaysen and Turner's "unreasonable market power" standard, in which the Government would be
required to adduce a variety of evidence concerning the structural features
(for example, market shares and condition of entry) and performance
characteristics (for example, technical efficiency) of the market in question,"5 I would limit inquiry by and large to conduct-how the firms
behave-and more narrowly still to conduct from which an absence of
effective competition can be inferred: cartel-like conduct. The more serious problem is whether it will be possible, given the limitations of economic science and of judicial fact-finding processes, to prove, by the kinds
of evidence enumerated above, that firms have been guilty of noncompetitive pricing. While it is true that such evidence is not entirely alien to Sherman Act proceedings,54 the record of the courts, as we are about to see, has
not been one to inspire confidence in their ability to handle economic evidence. Before elaborating this point, may I point out that the workability
of the proposed standard could be improved if a substantial research
effort in the area of cartel and oligopoly behavior were undertaken. Despite
decades of intense concern with pricing under oligopoly, we know little
about which industries in fact exhibit noncompetitive pricing and what patterns of price leadership, price rigidity, market-share stability, and other
market phenomena connote collusion. This deficiency should be remediable, although it will require not only scholarly attention but also the cooperation of the government agencies that have the necessary fact-gathering
53- See C. KAYsEN &D. TusNusR, supra note z6, at 112-13. But cf. id. at 267-68.
54. See, e.g., American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (946) (discussed in text following note 58 infra); C-O-Two Fire Equip. Co. v. United States, 197 F.2d 489 (gth Cir.), cert.
denied, 344 U.S. 892 (1952); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir.
1945). For an example of how an economic study can shed light on whether a market is behaving
Competitively see 2 J. BAIN, TBE ECoNoMIcs OF THE PACIFIC COAST PETROLEum INDUsTY 330-60
(1945). For an excellent recent case study of how sophisticated economic evidence can be used in
antitrust litigation see Lozowick, Steiner & Miller, Law and Quantitative Multivariate Analysis: An
Encounter, 66 MICH. L. Rav. 1641 (1968).
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powers and functions, such as the Bureau of the Census and the Federal
Trade Commission.
Pending this improvement in knowledge, courts will have to exercise
extreme care in drawing inferences of tacit collusion from market conduct. The pitfalls that abound in this area are illustrated by Professor
Turner's discussion of the Theatre Enterprises and American Tobacco
cases in his 1962 article. In the former case,5" the owner of a suburban
theater tried to purchase rights to first-run movies from several producerdistributors and was turned down by each. Professor Turner notes that
"there was . .. a great deal of testimony by defendants to the effect that

the decision of each was an independent one, based on purely individual
considerations, ' 'es and concludes that the case "was one in which it would
have been absurd to direct a verdict on the ground that consciously parallel action clearly showed agreement.""7 I am more troubled by the case.
The practice of selling the right to exhibit a film at two prices, a higher
price for immediate exhibition ("first runs") and a lower price for later
exhibition, would appear to be a form of price discrimination. The cost
to the distributor is the same regardless of when the film is to be exhibited, but a two-price system enables him to exploit the willingness of some
moviegoers to pay a premium to see a film when it is first released. As
noted earlier, systematic price discrimination cannot persist for long under competition. If, therefore, one assumes, as has the Court in all of the
movie cases, that the distributors are in competition with each other-are
selling close substitutes even though their films are copyrighted and in
that sense unique-the refusal of any distributor to sell first runs to the
plaintiff in Theatre Enterprises is difficult to understand other than in
a context of collusive behavior.
The distributors, it is true, expressed concern that the plaintiff would
be in competition with their existing first-run theaters; but this only underscores their reluctance to spoil the higher-priced market by freely
granting first-run rights. And, although they expressed skepticism as to
the plaintiff's ability to pay first-run prices, there was no suggestion that
any distributor would not have made money doing business with plaintiff.
The distributors testified that their films would receive greater "exposure"
by being shown in downtown theaters first, but one would think that
maximum exposure would be promoted rather than impaired by licensing
additional first-run theaters; it is especially difficult to understand how a
two-price system fosters exposure. The inference that the refusal was motivated by fear that an expansion in the number of first-run theaters
would endanger the defendants' discriminatory system of film distribu55. Theatre Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537 (I954).
56. Turner, supra note 7, at 657.
57. Id. at 658.
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tion seems, in the circumstances, the most plausible, although I do not

consider the evidence for this interpretation conclusive. Here, incidentally, is a case where purely tacit collusion was quite feasible. A distributor
could not have concealed the grant of first-run status to the plaintiff.
Competing distributors would have found out what had happened as soon
as they read the theater page.
American Tobacco Co. v. United States8 is a case that Turner views as
a classic example of noncompetitive behavior under oligopoly:
[T]he Government charged that the three leading cigarette manufacturers had,
among other things, conspired to fix prices in the sale of their cigarettes. The
Government's evidence on this aspect of the case consisted chiefly of economic
facts, including the following. All three companies charged identical prices for
their cigarettes from 1928 to 1940. In this period, there were only seven price
changes. A price change initiated by one company would be almost immediately
followed by the other two, who refused to make further sales to dealers until
their corresponding price changes were made effective. The three companies substantially raised their prices in 1931, though their costs were declining and there
was a general depression. This led to a substantial increase in their profits for a
period of time, even though their total sales declined as some consumers switched
to the cheap "ten cent" brands. In 1931, at the time of the price increase, the three
large companies together accounted for ninety per cent of all cigarette sales.
Any economist worthy of the name would immediately brand this price behavior as noncompetitive. One can hardly find clearer evidence of an absence of
effective competition than an increase of prices in the face of declining costs and
weakening demand. 9

I consider the evidence recited by Turner more equivocal. The fact that
the three leading cigarette manufacturers charged identical prices for 12
years would indicate a suspicious rigidity and uniformity of prices if these
were transaction prices. But they were list prices, and identity of list prices
in an industry with only three major sellers, selling a standard product,
is unsurprising, as are the facts that list prices were changed infrequently
and that a change in list price by one was matched promptly by the others.
The vital question is how much shading of the list prices there was; we
know there was some.6"
The most curious aspect of the evidence relates to the 1931 price increase. For a monopolist (or a cartel) to raise price in the face of declining
costs and demand is evidence not of noncompetitive conduct but of irrationality. A profit-maximizing monopolist or cartel will reduce price
when either costs or demand-or both-decline.6 The only exceptions
58. 328 U.S. 78, (946).

59. Turner, supranote 7, at 66o-6i.
6o. See W. NicHOLLS, PRicE PoLIcIEs IN T=a CGAnrrz INDuSTRY-A STUny OF "CoNcERTED
AcTIoN" AND I-s SocIAL CONTROL i91i-5o, at78, 89 (95).
61. In Figure 3, costs have fallen from MC to MC'; the new profit-maximizing price, Pm', is

lower than the old. In Figure 4, demand has declined from dd to dd'; again, the new profit-maximiz-
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would be if the monopoly or cartel were first formed in a period of declining cost or demand, or if it had previously been unable to establish
the joint maximizing price; but if there was tacit collusion among the
leading cigarette manufacturers it was apparently fully operative well
before the 1931 price increase.62
There is another version of what happened in 1931, which runs as
follows." Reynolds was the first cigarette manufacturer to wrap cigarette
ing price is lower than the old. In Figure 5, both costs and demand have declined, resulting in an even
sharper drop in price by the profit-maximizing monopolist.
FIGURE 3
FIGURE 4

Output

Output
FIusR 5

-MC
MC'
MR'

Output

It might well be rational for a monopolist or cartel to raise price if demand were not declining
but rather becoming more inelastic; and there are some who believe that demand curves do tend to
become more inelastic in times of depression (and some who believe the opposite). See Ruggles, The
Nature o1 Price Flexibility and the Determinantsof Relative Price Changes in the Economy, in BusiNZss CONCaNTRATION AND PRICE POLICY 441, 461z-62 (Nat'l Bureau Econ. Research 1955). There is
no evidence, however, that the cigarette manufacturers believed that the depression had made the
demand for cigarettes less elastic.
62. See W. NicHoLLs, supra note 6o, at 78, 88-89.
63. The following description is based on id. at 83-88. Nicholls himself, it should be noted, concludes that "the fact that all saw fit to follow Reynolds' increase in 1931 suggests a strong element of
cartel-like behavior." Id. at 89. The facts that he recites, however, support the alternative explanation
given in text.
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packages in cellophane and its rivals were not immediately able to adopt
the technique. Thinking that consumers would pay more for "humidorwrapped" cigarettes, especially if the innovation was well advertised,
Reynolds raised its price by about 6 percent and at the same time substantially increased its advertising. Its major competitors could have remained
at the previous price, but they decided to match Reynolds' price increase
and to counter its advertising campaign with stepped-up efforts of their
own. They were convinced that the consumer was insensitive to small
price differences. After all, cigarette revenues had held up well during
the depression without any price cut, indicating no weakening in demand despite the general economic condition. The consumer might even
infer that their product was inferior to Reynolds' if sold at a lower price.
Tobacco costs were declining, but, as mentioned, increased advertising
outlays were contemplated. This pattern of conduct-successful product
differentiation leading to a higher price and higher advertising outlayscould occur under competitive conditions.
The companies' estimate of market conditions was poor. Within 18
months the market share of the economy brands had increased more than
7o-fold, from 0.3 to 22.8 percent,64 and the major sellers had rescinded the
price increase, their position permanently impaired." The rapid erosion
of the majors' market share indicates how limited their power over price
actually was; but what is more important to the present discussion is that
their pricing behavior can be plausibly explained without hypothesizing
tacit collusion. Not to labor the point unduly, price behavior is often
equivocal evidence of collusion. That should not lead one to despair entirely of the workability of the suggested rule. If sellers engage in tacit
collusion with any success they will generate some of the kinds of evidence
discussed,66 and I do not assume that courts are congenitally incapable
of handling such evidence intelligently. If colluding sellers generate no
such evidence, their collusive efforts will not have amounted to much.
Economically significant collusion should leave some visible traces in the
pricing behavior of the market, even granting fully the interpretive difficulties that such behavior presents.
64. Id. at 92.
65. See Tennant, The CigaretteIndustry, in Tim STR CTURE oF AMERcAN INDUSTRY 357, 367
(3d ed. NV. Adams 196I).
66. For a persuasive argument that the behavior of the steel industry in the r95o's indicated tacit
collusion see Adelman, Steel, Administered PDices and Inflation, 75 Q.J. EcoN. x6 (i961). The type
of evidence that Professor Adelman was able to obtain from public documents-evidence relating to
the manner and timing of price increases and to the pricing behavior of the industry in the face of very
substantial excess capacity-might not be sufficient to persuade a court that the firms had in fact tacitly
colluded; but the circumstances he relates are exceedingly suspicious, and a diligent inquiry by the
Department of Justice might well have developed sufficient economic evidence to justify a finding of
guilt under the standard proposed in this Article. Only an actual attempt to apply the standard will
reveal whether it is workable.

HeinOnline -- 21 Stan. L. Rev. 1587 1968-1969

1588

STANFORD LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 21: Page 1562

C. The Problem of Remedy
It remains to consider whether an interpretation of section i forbidding
tacit collusion would be effective in altering the conduct of sellers in the
desired way; whether, in other words, the sanctions for'violation of the
rule would be adequate. I shall address, first, the general adequacy of the
sanctions for illegal price-fixing, and then the special problems that might
be involved in fashioning remedies against tacit collusion.
It will be convenient to distinguish two types of sanction: the remedial
and the punitive. The line between the two categories is not hard and fast,
but in general the remedial sanction seeks merely to redress or head off
injury-simple damages and an injunction are examples-while the punitive sanction seeks to deter violations by an exaction that may be greater
than either the profit to the wrongdoer or the injury to his victims. Pricefixing provides an excellent example of why punitive sanctions are sometimes necessary to ensure reasonable compliance with the law. In deciding
whether to comply with a legal rule, a rational individual will discount
the gravity of the possible sanction by the probability of escaping detectione Price-fixing can be concealed. The probability of escaping detection is greater than zero, probably far greater. If the only sanction for
illegal price-fixing were simple damages or injunction, firms would have
an inadequate incentive to comply with the law. If caught, they would simply be forced to disgorge past profits from price-fixing or to forgo future
opportunities to fix prices; and since they would often not be caught, it
would in general be worth their while to fix prices, assuming, of course, that
the costs of collusion in the particular circumstances were less than the anticipated returns.
I have overstated the case slightly. Damages, were they correctly computed in price-fixing cases, would normally exceed the monopoly profits
of the colluders,68 and a broadly worded injunction might inhibit a defendant's freedom of action beyond simply preventing it from engaging
in illegal price-fixing. Even remedial sanctions against price-fixing, therefore, would inescapably contain punitive features in the sense I am using
the term. Still, there is little doubt that punitive sanctions are a necessary
element of an effective rule against price-fixing.
There is reason to question whether the punitive sanctions that can be
imposed against price fixers under existing law are adequate. Violation of
the Sherman Act is a misdemeanor; violators can be fined up to $50,000 and
(if individuals) imprisoned for up to one year."6 Prison terms, however,
67. Cf. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 78 J. POL. EcoN. 169 (x968).
68. See note 103 infra.
69. Sherman Antitrust Act § i, i5 U.S.C. § 1 (1964).
70. See J. CLABAULT & J. BURTON, supra note 29, at I I, 55-
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are rarely imposed and when imposed are usually nominal in length," and
the maximum fine is too small to have a significant deterrent effect on a
large corporation. To be sure, a corporation must act through individuals,
and the fine, together with the stigma of criminal conviction, may be quite
enough to deter most corporate officers and employees from attempting to
fix prices even when no prison sentence is likely to be imposed. Still, the
absence of effective penalties on the corporation is troubling.
The threat of a private treble-damage suit provides an additional, and
probably quite important, element of deterrence; but its deterrent value is
limited. The penalty component in the award, being limited to twice the
actual damages, may not be adequate in all cases. Moreover, since damages
are extremely difficult to prove in a price-fixing case-what is involved is
a determination of what the competitive price would have been had the
defendants not colluded-tying the penalty to the provable damages may
frequently result in judgments that are too small. Perhaps the most serious
deficiency of the treble-damage suit is that the usual victims of illegal pricefixing are in no position to invoke it. In general, a price-fixing conspiracy,
if effective, will inflict harm (i) on a large number of nonbusiness (mostly
individual) consumers and (2), if the members of the conspiracy sell to
other business firms rather than directly to the ultimate consumer, possibly
on the owners of certain factors of production used by those firms, who
need not be the firms' shareholders.72 The injury to an individual consumer
71. See Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964).
72. This point is illustrated in Figure 6. Suppose that the purchasers of the product whose price
is fixed are themselves business firms, and the effect of the conspiracy is to raise their costs from MC
to MC'. The firms will raise their price from P to P' and reduce their output from 0 to 0'. Customers
of the firms will suffer. They will pay P'ACPmore, and will also be forced to turn to substitute products that are inferior for their purposes, a loss in value to them measured by the area ABC. Owners of
certain durable instruments of production (such as land) will also be hurt, although to a much lesser
extent; their returns (or "quasi-rents") will be reduced from PBD to P'AE. The firms' shareholders
will not be harmed, however, unless the firms are themselves the owners of the rent-receiving factors
or were previously receiving monopoly profits. Furthermore, there will be no loss of quasi-rents if costs
are constant rather than increasing or if the rent-receiving factors are nonspecialized and can earn
equivalent rents in other employments. In general, then, it would appear that consumers are the principal victims of price-fixing conspiracies.
Fmnuan 6
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or factor owner, however, will ordinarily be too small to warrant incurring
the expense of a lawsuit.
The courts in recent years have sought to get around this problem by
permitting business customers to sue for thrice the difference between what
they paid the conspirators and what they would have paid under competition, regardless of whether the higher price in fact caused them any injury,
and by sanctioning class actions in which the class consists of consumers
injured by the conspiracy.7 Both devices are unsatisfactory. It is anomalous
to permit suits for damages by firms that have not been injured; moreover, a firm may hesitate to jeopardize its good relations with suppliers
merely to bring a suit for windfall profits. The class action, save for large
institutional purchasers, is a delusion. There is no feasible method of locating and reimbursing the consumer who several years ago may have paid
too much for a toothbrush (or substituted another product) as the result of
a price-fixing conspiracy among toothbrush manufacturers. In these circumstances the class action becomes a device by which enterprising lawyers
obtain large fees.
Both the remedial and punitive sanctions for illegal price-fixing would
be strengthened by amending the Sherman Act to authorize suits by the
United States for both the total damages attributable to an alleged conspiracy and an appropriate civil monetary penalty. (At present the Government can sue for damages only when it has been a victim of the unlawful
conspiracy and can recover only its actual damages plus the cost of suit.)7"
Determination of the amount of the penalty should be left to the judge's
discretion, to be exercised in light of the gravity of the offense, the size of
the corporation, and its previous record of antitrust violations. (One might
wish to retain double the actual damages as the minimum penalty, but there
should be no maximum.) The entire judgment, both actual damages and
penalty, would be paid into the Treasury. The procedure would displace
the private suit in any case where the Government sued, since it would be
inappropriate to permit the same damages to be recovered in successive suits.
Pending such a reform, one is compelled to acknowledge a deficiency
in the penalty structure of the price-fixing prohibition. This deficiency
would be especially serious in the context of tacit collusion. Being more
difficult to detect than express collusion, it should be punished, if anything,
more severely.75 In a case of tacit collusion, moreover, a court might be
73. See Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481 (1968); City of Philadelphia v. Morton Salt Co., 385 F.2d X22 ( 3 d Cir. 1967), cert. denied sub nom. New York v. Morton
Salt Co., 390 U.S. 995 (1968). I know of no antitrust class action in which individual (as opposed to
institutional) consumers have been permitted to recover, although such recovery would be permitted
under a recent settlement proposal made by a group of drug manufacturers who are defendants in a
private price-fixing suit, Wall Street Journal, Feb. 6, 1969, at 2, col. 2.
74. See Clayton Act § 4A, 15 U.S.C. S i5a (1964).
75. This assumes, but I think reasonably, that tacit price-fixing is no less morally opprobrious
than express price-fixing.
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reluctant to impose any criminal penalties, at least until the rule forbidding
it had become well established and clearly defined. I am not prepared to
admit, however, that the deficiency in the penalty structure, serious as it is,
would be fatal to a rule forbidding tacit collusion under section i. The
threat of private treble-damage actions would provide some deterrence. In
addition, when a violation was discovered and enjoined,76 there would
then be an effective deterrent against a repetition of the offense by the convicted firms. The penalty for violating the injunction would depend entirely upon the discretion of the judge; there is no fixed maximum." Violation of an injunction against tacit collusion may be difficult to prove, but
no more so than the original violation of law that gave rise to the injunction.
Moreover, there may be extreme cases where dissolution is the appropriate remedy for convicted tacit colluders because repetition of the offense
is difficult to prevent by other means. Ordinarily the conventional remedies should be adequate, but courts should not shrink from employing dissolution in an exceptional case." It is no objection that dissolution is addressed to market structure rather than behavior. As noted earlier, noncompetitive pricing is very much a function of the structure of the market;
even express collusion is rarely practicable in markets that are not oligopolistic in structure. The possibility of dissolution should provide an additional deterrent to tacit collusion.
Assuming that the oligopolist can be given a strong incentive to comply
with a legal rule forbidding tacit collusion, will it be possible for him to
comply? Or would compliance involve such irrational behavior, as Professor Turner argues, that it could not realistically be expected?" I observed earlier that it is quite rational for an oligopolist to decide not to
collude. What is involved is a decision to expand output until the return
to investors is roughly equal to what they could earn in other activities, a
course routinely followed by sellers in competitive markets. There are, as
we saw, quite good reasons why even in the absence of legal penalty an
oligopolist might decide not to restrict output: inability to predict his rivals'
reactions and fear that they would cheat. Punishing tacit colluders would
76. I have in mind a relatively simple and general injunction against express or tacit price-fixing,
the principal purpose of which would be to supply a predicate, as discussed in the text, for the imposition of very severe penalties in the event of a subsequent episode of price-fixing by the defendants. I do
not suggest that the injunction attempt to regulate the details of the defendants' pricing.
77. See United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 302-o6 (1947).
78. In some cases a conditional decree of dissolution might be the appropriate remedy. The defendants would know that a resumption of noncompetitive pricing would result in actual dissolution.
Cf. United States v. American Optical Co., 1966 Trade Cas. 82,61o (E.D. Wis. x966). The courts
dearly have power to order dissolution in any price-fixing case in which that is the appropriate remedy.
Dissolution has, of course, been ordered in a number of monopolization cases, and the remedial provisions for sections i and 2 of the Sherman Act are identical. See Sherman Antitrust Act § 4, r5 U.S.C.
§ 4 (1964).
79. See Turner, supra note 7, at 669.
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provide an additional and potent reason to abjure noncompetitive pricing'
This should be true even in the example that Turner offers as the clinching
argument for his view: where demand is declining and competitive prices
would entail losses to the industry.8 Express collusion may often be the
only expedient that will enable an industry to avoid losses in a period of
declining demand, yet one assumes that the prohibition against such collusion retains a considerable deterrent effect even in those circumstances.
Firms faced with losses will not collude if they anticipate that the cost of
collusion, as a result of punishment, will exceed its benefit in averting
business losses. Oligopolists would reason the same way were tacit collusion illegal under section i.
Businessmen should have no difficulty, moreover, in determining when
they are behaving noncompetitively. Tacit collusion is not an unconscious
state. If the sales division of a company recommends that it offer a wider
variety of products in order to exploit consumer demand more effectively,
and the financial division recommends against that course on the ground
.that it will make it more difficult for the industry to maintain "healthy"
prices, top management can be in no doubt of the significance of its action
if it adopts the financial division's recommendation. More generally, given
the tension between sales and financial executives that characterizes most
corporations, the question whether to collude tacitly will be thrust upon
i management constantly. The sales people will argue for offering discounts
to lure away rivals' customers, for varying prices promptly as conditions of
demand and cost change, for reducing prices to utilize idle capacity or to
exploit locational advantages, and for other competitive, sales-increasing
tactics; and, whenever they do, management will have to balance their
claims against the advantages of securing or maintaining an understanding
with the company's rivals to limit price competition. This calculus will be
affected by threat of punishment.
The oligopolist who does refrain from restricting output runs no
appreciable risk of being penalized for collusion nonetheless. If he is a
leading seller-and a rule against tacit collusion would be invoked only
against the leading sellers in a market-his refusal to accede to an understanding on prices will make it impossible for the other firms to maintain noncompetitive prices, and there will be no systematic price discrimination, no persistent excess capacity attributable to restriction of output, no
monopolistic pattern of reaction of price to cost changes-in short, none of
the symptoms of collusion.
8o. I emphasize that I am not proposing that equivalence of price and marginal cost be the test
of compliance with section i. All I am arguing is that a deliberate restriction of output by competitors
is conduct that rational men can avoid-and will avoid if it is made sufficiently costly to them to
engage in it
8r. See Turner, supra note 7, at 670.
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In closing, might I suggest that if there is a good case to be made against
the proposed employment of section I of the Sherman Act, it will be built
on the practical difficulties of proving tacit collusion. That, rather than the
doctrinal or remedial questions, is the heart of the problem and should be
the focus of the debate.
IV. STRUCTURAL SOLUTIONS TO THE OLIGOPOLY PROBLEM

I turn now to other remedies, alternative or supplemental, that have
been suggested for dealing with the problem of noncompetitive pricing by
oligopolists: new legislation dealing specifically with oligopolies; a reinterpretation of section 2 of the Sherman Act (the monopolization provision) to reach oligopolies; and strict enforcement of section 7 of the Clayton Act against horizontal mergers, to prevent the emergence of new or
the aggravation of existing oligopolies. These remedies have in common
the fact that they regulate the structure of markets rather than the pricing
or other behavior of the sellers in them. Among structural remedies, one
can distinguish between those that change existing market structures
through dissolution of large firms and prophylactic remedies that attack
the causes of concentration, as by forbidding mergers.
A. Restructuring Oligopoly Markets
I. The legislative route.
In Antitrust Policy, Professors Kaysen and Turner proposed the enactment of a statute condemning "unreasonable market power" and authorizing the dissolution of firms found to possess it.8" The premise of this
approach is that the existing antitrust laws cannot deal effectively with
noncompetitive pricing by oligopolists. If that premise is rejected, the proposal is unattractive. To prevail under the unreasonable-market-power
standard, the Government would have to establish the existence of a variety
of structural, behavioral, and performance characteristics. The scope of inquiry contemplated is broader than in a section i proceeding, and indeed
so broad as to raise serious questions of practicability.
A variation of this approach, which Kaysen and Turner also discuss
and endorse, would equate unreasonable market power with the possession
by the leading firms of a particular aggregate share of the market." This
82. See text accompanying note 16 supra.
83. They propose the following statutory provision: "Market power . . . shall be conclusively
presumed where, for five years or more, one company has accounted for 50 percent or more of annual
sales in the market, or four or fewer companies have accounted for 8o percent of sales." C. KAYsEN &
D. TutrNas, supra note 16, at 267. Unless the defendants could show that their market power was
justified (as by economies of scale), it would be deemed unreasonable. See id. at 268. It is interesting
to note that elsewhere in Antitrust Policy the authors express considerable skepticism as to the appropriateness of their market-share test of market power. See id. at 98-99. President Johnson's antitrust
task force (see note 15 supra) proposed a similar statute. See Report of the White House Task Force
on Antitrust Policy, Part II and App. A (July 5, x968, mimeo.). The differences of detail between the
Kaysen-Turner and task-force proposals do not affect the discussion in text.
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approach is much like that employed in the administration of the antimerger law against horizontal mergers, where market-share percentages
are the basic touchstone of illegality. Its principal appeal lies in dispensing
with the requirement of proof that pricing is in fact noncompetitive in the
highly concentrated industries subject to the legislation. But that is a questionable advantage, unless one is quite confident, contrary to our conclusion
in part II-B, that high concentration is by itself a sufficient condition for
noncompetitive pricing. It is an advantage of my proposal that, by requiring the Government to prove noncompetitive pricing, it will force inquiry
as to whether and in what circumstances oligopoly in fact leads to such
pricing. One might reply that the best way to learn about the economic
characteristics of an industry is by patient academic study, not litigation.
In principle that may be correct, but in fact most industry studies by economists have been based on the records of antitrust cases.
The approach has other troublesome aspects. One is its coverage. Not
only is it unclear whether tacit collusion is rife in the limited number of
industries embraced by any proposal that defines the area of illegality solely
in terms of market shares, but tacit collusion may be a serious problem in
many of the remaining industries." Furthermore, dissolution, which Kaysen and Turner propose as the normal remedy in unreasonable marketpower cases,8" is neither the only possible remedy for noncompetitive pricing
by oligopolists, as we have seen, nor generally the best remedy. It is likely to
involve appreciable social cost. At the least, the reconstitution of a major
industry will involve substantial administrative expenses; and if the firms
are dissolved into units smaller than the efficient scale of operation in the
industry, much larger social costs may be incurred. One can attempt to
avoid the second result by allowing in defense proof that economies of scale
would be lost by the reduction of firm size. But having to litigate that issue
will increase the expenses of the proceeding; and the difficulty of determining efficient scale is such that erroneous results can be anticipated in
many cases," so that economies of scale may be sacrificed inadvertently.
84. Kaysen and Turner get around this problem by proposing the market-share test as a supplement, rather than as an alternative, to their basic standard of unreasonable market power. See C. KAYsEN &D. TURNER, supra note 16, at 267. The task-force proposal (see note 83 supra) lacks this feature.
85. C. KAYSEN & D. TuRNER, supra note x6, at 269.
86. There are two methods of determining efficient scale. One is by means of engineering and
cost studies that attempt to determine efficiency directly. The extraordinary, and indeed disabling, difficulties involved in that method are discussed in Smith, Survey of the Empirical Evidence on Economies of Scale, in BusiNEss CONCENTRaTrON AND PRICE POLICY 213 (Nat'l Bureau Econ. Research
1955); Friedman, Comment, in id. at 230. The other, and more promising, method is the survivor
method. See Stigler, The Economies of Scale, I J. LAw & EcoN. 54 (1958), reprinted in G. STIE.R,
supra note 3x, at 71. Under that method, a scale of operation is deemed efficient if the total output of
firms having that scale is stable or growing in relation to the other firms in the industry, and inefficient
if it is declining. The survivor method is not, however, free from substantial difficulties of application;
these are discussed by Professor Stigler in his Addendum: DrawingInferences from Firm Size on the
Economies of Scale, in G. STIGLER, supra at 89. An important problem in the immediate context is
that application of the survivor method may require charting the fortunes of various size classes of
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The threat of dissolution may also have a serious disincentive effect. Firms
might hold back from expanding sales to the point at which they would
become subject to dissolution under the statute, even if they were more efficient than their competitors. Kaysen and Turner would, to be sure, allow
defendants to show in defense that their market power was attributable
to completely laudable circumstances, notably their "extraordinary efficiency,""7 but such a concept is, in my opinion, too nebulous to serve as a
criterion of legality. Nor would such a defense, even f feasible, entirely
solve the problem of disincentive effects. As leading sellers approached the
point at which their aggregate market share would be so large as to trigger
dissolution proceedings, they might decide to raise price as a means of preventing further growth and forestalling dissolution. That would aggravate
the very problem, monopoly pricing, to which the proposed legislation is
principally addressed.
Joint monopolization.
Under current interpretations of section 2 of the Sherman Act,88 a
single firm that has had a monopoly of a relevant market for a substantial
period of time will probably be adjudged guilty of monopolization unless
the market is a natural monopoly (that is, can efficiently accommodate only
a single firm) or unless its monopoly is the result of a patent still in force.89
It has been urged that this principle should be extended to oligopoly."
Oligopoly (under this view) is simply shared or joint monopoly, and oligopolists should be dissolved so as to dissipate their monopoly power. The
attraction of this approach to its proponents is that it leads to the same
result as special oligopoly legislation without having to persuade Congress
to amend the law. I could rest, therefore, with a reference back to my objections to the legislative route. But the judicial approach has problems of
its own that merit discussion.
It seems fairly clear that the original purpose of section 2 was to reach
practices by which firms achieved monopoly power or sought to maintain
it against potential entrants.91 Many such practices, to be sure, could readily
have been attacked as conspiracies in restraint of trade (for example, the
series of acquisitions that resulted in the formation of the Standard Oil
2.

firms over a substantial period of time during which efficient size in the industry may be changing as
a result of changes in demand or technology.
87. C. KAYsEN & D. TURNER, supra note x6, at 268.
88. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1964).
89. This is Professor Turner's conclusion in his most recent article, supra note 19, at 1x29; I am
to agree.
inclined
o
9 .See id. at 523i. See also references cited in note 18 supra. Professor Turner implies, however,
that something more than merely an oligopoly market share would be required to trigger the application of section 2 in this context; evidence of noncompetitive pricing would apparently be required. See
Turner, supranote i9, at x225-26.

95. See, e.g., United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. so6, 181-83 (9W5);

note 45, at 28-30.
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Trust)," but not all: Monopolizing practices of a single firm could not be
reached under the first section. Construed along the foregoing lines, section 2 might still have some application to oligopolists; for there may be
cases where firms seek to obtain or retain an oligopoly position as a basis
for exercising monopoly power through express or tacit collusion, and I
would have no difficulty in viewing these as monopolization cases. But this
would provide no general answer to the oligopoly problem.
Learned Hand's Alcoa opinion73 seems to have broken decisively with
the interpretation of section 2 suggested above by holding (or at least
implying) that the condition of being a monopolist for a substantial period
of time is a violation, regardless of whether improper tactics were used to
obtain or maintain the monopoly, unless the defendant can show that the
monopoly was the product purely of economies of scale or of superior technical excellence (for example, as embodied in patents). Even in its original
context of single-firm monopoly, the Alcoa doctrine seems open to serious
question. There are three plausible explanations as to why a nonregulated
monopoly has continued for a long time. The monopolist may have charged
a low price, which made entry unattractive. He may have charged monopoly prices, but still not attracted new entry, either because the economies
of scale were such as to allow room for only one firm in the market or because the monopolist, due to superior efficiency, had lower costs than a new
entrant would have had. Finally, the monopolist may have employed bad
practices such as patent abuse or area price discrimination to keep out
entrants (for reasons that would carry us too far afield to consider here,
this last hypothesis is perhaps the least likely). In none of these cases would
elaborate structural reformation of the industry-whose costs have already
been discussed-be warranted. In the first, the usual objections to monopoly lack force. In the second, the Alcoa court itself would exonerate the
defendant. One could argue that exceptional technical or managerial efficiency should not be a defense because dissolution of the firm would not
necessarily entail the sacrifice of efficiencies unrelated to scale. But of course
the parceling out of the firm's assets and personnel among the successor
firms might well destroy whatever happy combination of resources had
been responsible for the firm's exceptional efficiency. Judge Hand was also
on sound ground in worrying about the disincentive effects of visiting dissolution upon a firm whose monopoly is the product of such efficiency. In
the third case, an injunction against the bad practices should normally provide adequate relief. Perhaps there are instances where a monopolist, although not unusually efficient or aggressive, or favored by overwhelming
92. See McGee, Predatory Price Cutting: The Standard Oil (N.J.) Case, i J. LAVW& Eco.,. 137
(,958).
93. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
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economies of scale, can nonetheless persist over a substantial period of time
in charging monopoly prices without attracting new entry; but this is a
matter for inquiry, not assumption.
If the Alcoa doctrine seems inappropriate as a solution to the problems
raised by single-firm monopoly, it seems doubly inappropriate as applied
to oligopoly. The basis for inferring undesirable performance is much
stronger in the monopoly than in the oligopoly context. There are also
exquisite difficulties in defining the scope of the rule in the latter context.
It may not be entirely easy to decide what market share justifies classifying a single firm as a monopolist, but it would be far more difficult to
decide when a firm was an oligopolist for the purpose of triggering an
extended Alcoa doctrine. In this respect, a legislative cut-off point has much
to recommend it.
My reservations concerning structural reformation, whether by new or
under existing legislation, as a solution to the oligopoly problem can be restated as follows: With a few exceptions, such as where monopoly is conferred or protected by governmental franchise, a monopolist (or group
of jointly acting oligopolists) can maintain its position in the market for a
long time only (i) by forgoing monopoly gains, (z) by superior skill, (3)
by predatory practices directed against prospective entrants, or (4) because
the market is a natural monopoly. For the reasons noted earlier, none of
these conditions warrants a restructuring of the firms in the market. Monopolies that lack the support of these conditions will usually be shortlived, " and radical structural remedies, which are themselves costly and
protracted, seem inappropriate to cure transitory market imperfections.
It follows that antitrust policy should emphasize the prevention of practices
by which market power is obtained or exploited," but steer generally clear
of radical structural remedies.
I should make explicit two assumptions in the foregoing discussion.
The first is that the behavioral and prophylactic antitrust remedies such as
penalties and injunction are swift and relatively costless compared to dissolution proceedings. I suspect that careful empirical study would bear
this out, although no such study has, to my knowledge, ever been made.
But a proceeding against tacit collusion would doubtless be more costly
and protracted than most price-fixing-or even merger-cases. The second
assumption is that market processes will usually eliminate a monopoly
94. There is, of course, the possibility of recurrence, which may be especially great where the
source of the monopoly power is collusion. A collusive arrangement may be short-lived, but be revived
again and again.
95. One form of monopoly exploitation that I do not think the antitrust laws should attempt to
prevent is monopoly pricing by the single-firm monopolist. Where monopoly pricing is the result of
collusive activity, tacit or express, it is possible to eliminate it by eliminating the collusive activity. But
monopoly pricing by a single-firm monopolist can be eliminated only by fixing the prices it charges.
I have discussed elsewhere the acute problems involved in the direct regulation of monopoly prices
and profits. See Posner, NaturalMonopoly andIts Regulation, 21 STAN.L. Rav. 548 (1969).
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position not supported by one of the four mentioned conditions as quickly
as would a dissolution proceeding: more precisely, that the difference
between the costs imposed on society by a monopoly that is permitted
to fall of its own weight and the costs imposed by one that is eventually
dissolved by governmental action will usually not exceed the various direct
and indirect costs attributable to the dissolution proceeding. Unable to
prove that this is a correct assumption, I fall back on the proposition that
the Government ought not intervene in private affairs unless its intervention can be expected to have a positive net social product. It follows that if
my proposal to employ section i of the Sherman Act against tacit collusion
is rejected as unfeasible, the alternative of applying radical structural remedies in highly concentrated markets should, on the basis of present knowledge, also be rejected'
B. The Merger Guidelines
Section 7 of the Clayton Act, as amended in 195o, forbids mergers or
acquisitions whose effect may be substantially to lessen competition or tend
to create a monopoly in any line of commerce in any section of the country." The statute has been applied with extraordinary rigor to mergers
between direct competitors." The primary justification for so strict a policy
is that it is necessary to prevent oligopoly pricing. This subpart will attempt
an evaluation of that policy, drawing on the general analysis of oligopoly presented earlier in this Article. Our text will be the Department of
Justice Merger Guidelines, 0 a recent, authoritative, and reasoned exposition of the strict approach, and one premised explicitly on the concept of
oligopoly questioned here-the concept that a probability of noncompetitive pricing can be inferred from the number and size distribution alone of
the firms in the relevant market 0
i. The definition of market.

I begin with a necessary digression on the principles for defining the
relevant market in which to appraise a merger. A merger between a firm
that sells 25 percent of the canned apricots sold in Tacoma and one that
96. It has been argued that forced deconcentration of highly concentrated industries is warranted
by the extensive econometric evidence correlating concentration with profitability and the lack of comparable evidence correlating concentration with economies of scale. Report of the White House Task
Forceon Antitrust Policy, separate statement of Paul W. MacAvoy, i-B to 2-B (July 5, 1968, mimeo.).
Apart from questions as to the adequacy of the econometric evidence (see notes 36-37 supra and accompanying text), the analysis has two major weaknesses: (i) Given the acute difficulties involved in
measuring economies of scale (see note 86 supra), no inference concerning their importance in concentrated industries can fairly be drawn from the absence of a substantial body of econometric studies;
(2) as mentioned earlier, forced deconcentration would involve other costs besides the possible sacrifice
of economies of scale.
97. Clayton Act § 7, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § x8 (1964).
98. See, e.g., United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546 (1966); United States v. Von's
Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (a966).
99. x TRtuADE Ro. REP. 4430 (x968).
ioo. See id. at 6681-82.
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sells 20 percent cannot injure competition unless the sellers of canned
apricots in Tacoma could, by colluding, raise price above its previous level
without immediately losing the trade to other sellers. That will be impossible either if canned apricots have a close substitute (or many less-dose
substitutes) or if other sellers of canned apricots would, despite transportation costs or other barriers, find it profitable to sell in Tacoma should the
market price there rise by even a small amount. Only if neither of these
conditions is present can the merger affect price.
The Guidelines' handling of the concept of market leaves much to be
desired. A seller will not be deemed a part of the market if the included
sellers enjoy "some advantage"' 1 over him (an advantage that "need not
be great . . . so long as it is significant").' However, if the cost spread
between the included and excluded sellers (holding quality constant) was
only a few percent-not great, but significant, since it would be enough to
prevent the excluded sellers from diverting any business from the included
sellers so long as the latter did not raise their price-one would not be
greatly concerned even if all the included sellers merged. Such a merger
could not result in a price rise greater than the cost spread between excluded and included sellers, and the actual cost to society of the higher price
would probably be much less.' 3 In the more common case of a merger that
did not create a monopoly, the impact on price would be still smaller.
The specific provisions of the Guidelines relating to the geographical
dimension of the market are especially troublesome. Any geographical
area may be deemed a relevant market unless it clearly appears that there
sos. Id. at 6682.
102. Id.
1o. Figure 7 illustrates this point When the market price rises from P to P', those purchasers
who continue to buy the product pay a total of A more than they paid at the lower price. While a
private cost to the purchasers, this amount is not a cost to society but merely a transfer to the sellers:
The reduction in consumers' surplus is exactly matched by the increase in producers' surplus. The
social cost of the higher price is the smaller area B, the additional consumers' surplus that was generated at the greater output.
FiGURE 7

sK

0

0

Output
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are no transportation costs or other barriers to outsiders0 4 This is too
sweeping. The existence of economic barriers confronting sellers not active
in a particular local area does not make that area a market. To illustrate, if
tin cans sell for 25 cents in Kansas City and 20 cents in Pittsburgh, and
the cost of transporting cans from Pittsburgh to Kansas City is 5 cents, the
Pittsburgh sellers may very well sell no cans in Kansas City. But a slight
price rise in the Kansas City market would draw the Pittsburgh sellers in.
They are a part of the Kansas City market so far as predicting the possible price consequences of a merger is concerned.105
The Guidelines should be revised to dispel the unfortunate impression
(perhaps unintended) that it is proper to exclude from the relevant market
sellers who are barred by transportation or other costs from selling there
at the existing price but who would not be barred if that price were to rise,
even slightly, as a result of price-fixing. It would also be an improvement
if the Guidelines were more specific on market definition. I would suggest two new rules for this purpose. The first is that all sales of plants that
have (or at some time during the recent past had) some (nontrivial) sales
in the relevant market be included in the market. Such a plant should be
able quite easily to shift additional output to the area should a differential
price rise make such a shift attractive. Since this assumption will not always
be correct, the rule should allow for an exception. For example, where sales
from distant plants had been made only in periods of shortage when prices
in the local area were very high, the rule would not apply.
The second rule is that other sellers-that is, those who do not sell and
have not recently sold any part of their output in the area in questionshould be excluded from the relevant market if (i) the price (or prices)
they charge in their own market (or markets), plus the common-carrier
charges for shipping the product from their markets to the one in question,
appreciably exceed (say, by 5 or more percent, depending on the absolute
size of the market in question) the market price in the latter market; or
(2) they are forbidden by law to sell in that market. This is an easily applied test for excluding from the relevant market firms that would be
barred by transportation costs or legal restrictions even if the market price
rose appreciably. Again, an exception is necessary. Sometimes it may be
104. Department of Justice Merger Guidelines, i TRADE REo. REP. 4430, at 6683 (i968).
105. The qualifying clause in this sentence--"so far as predicting the effects of a merger is con-

cerned"-deserves emphasis. In a monopolization, rather than a merger, case it might be quite appropriate to exclude the Pittsburgh sellers. Suppose only one company sold tin cans in Kansas City,
and the question was whether it had a monopoly of a relevant market. It would not be enough to find
that substitution would occur if the Kansas City seller raised his price further; the 25-cent price might
be the monopoly price. The relevant inquiry would be whether Pittsburgh sellers could sell in Kansas
City if the price there rose slightly above competitive levels; if not, Kansas City is a relevant market
so far as determining the existence of market power is concerned. When the question is what further
effect on price a merger might have, however, it is unnecessary to inquire whether existing prices are
competitive.
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possible for outside sellers quite inexpensively to overcome apparently
formidable transport problems by establishing a local production or distribution point.
A considerable gray area will remain: (i) cases where an exception to
one of the rules is argued; (2) cases in which transportation charges are not
readily determinable by inspection of filed common-carrier tariffs or where
additional costs (transportation costs in the broadest sense but not freight
costs) peculiar to the local market in question may prevent outsiders from
selling there unless the market price rises by a considerable amount. These
exceptional situations will have to be treated on a case-by-case basis; guidelines cannot be particularly helpful.
2.

The criteriaof illegalityfor horizontalmergers.

The Guidelines provide that if a market is "highly concentrated" (defined as where the four largest firms account for at least 75 percent of the
sales in the market), a merger between two firms each with a 4 percent
market share will be challenged; but if the acquiring firm has a 15 percent
share the acquired firm need have only i percent for the merger to be challenged.o"' If the market is "less highly concentrated," the operative percentages are higher, although not by much: 5 percent for the acquiring
firm if the firms are the same size, 25 percent if the acquired firm has only
a i percent market share. 7 If there is a "significant trend toward increased
concentration" (defined as where the market share of any grouping of
firms between the two and the eight largest has increased by 7 percent in the
previous 5-io years), any acquisition by a firm in that grouping of any
other firm having a market share of 2 percent or more will be challenged
unless the market is "wholly unconcentrated,"' 8 a term that, like "less
highly concentrated," is not defined.
I am sympathetic in two respects to the Guidelines' emphasis on marketshare percentages as the primary touchstone of legality. First, it seems appropriate to challenge mergers that markedly increase concentration in
already highly concentrated markets or that create high concentration in
an industry that previously had an atomistic structure. Since oligopoly
appears to be a necessary although not sufficient condition of collusive behavior that will often escape detection (tacit collusion, in my term), a
proper office of the merger law is to prevent the emergence of highly concentrated markets. Second, tacit collusion is rarely a problem when a market is not highly concentrated. It follows that we need have little concern
with mergers that do not create (or aggravate) a high level of concentraio6. Department of Justice Merger Guidelines, i TRDE REo. R,.
107. Id. at 6684.
1o8. Id.

4430, at 6683 (1968).
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tion."' Nevertheless the present Guidelines forbid a variety of mergers,
some quite small, in markets that are not highly concentrated.
A better approach would be to begin by identifying some threshold
below which the danger of effective tacit collusion is slight. One could then
ignore any merger in a market that had not reached the threshold unless
the merger pushed the market across it. An initial question is how to
measure concentration. It is customary to describe the level of concentration in a market in terms of the aggregate market share of the four or eight
largest firms. This takes no account, however, of the distribution of market
shares within the top group or of the number and size of the firms outside
that group, although the likelihood of noncompetitive pricing is diminished if there is a fringe of small firms and enhanced if one or two firms
are clearly dominant. Compare a market of eight firms in which the leading
firm has a 65 percent market share and the other seven each have 5 percent
with a market of ioo sellers in which the four largest firms have 20 percent
each, with the rest divided about equally among the remaining firms. The
first market is more likely than the second to behave noncompetitively, but
the four-firm concentration ratios are the same (8o percent).
A more discriminating index of concentration is provided by the Herfindahl measure, which expresses the level of concentration in terms of the
sum of the squares of each firm's market share. 10 In our example, the
first market would have a Herfindahl measure of o.44, and the second a
much lower Herfindahl measure: a shade over o.16. One can complain that
the Herfindahl measure is also arbitrary. But too little is known about the
precise relationship of concentration to collusion to devise a measure of

concentration that will accurately gauge the probable effect of different
concentration patterns on pricing, and the Herfindahl measure, in addition
to the virtues already mentioned, correlates well with a factor that is
crucial to behavior in oligopolies: the ease of detecting cheating."'
The advantages of the Herfindahl measure can be further illustrated
by considering specific thresholds. If one were to use four- or eight-firm
concentration ratios as the basis for determining the threshold below which
mergers would not be challenged, a plausible rule would be not to challenge a merger if the eight largest firms in the market had less than 50
so 9 . One could argue that small horizontal mergers should be forbidden lest a series of such
mergers, each innocuous in itself, result in transforming an unconcentrated into a highly concentrated
market. But that danger should be adequately taken care of by the threshold device discussed in the
following paragraph of text.
xio. See G. STiGLER, supra note 3, at 31-36; Adelman, Comment on the "H" Concentration
Measure as a Numbers-Equivalent, 5 Rav. EcoN. & STAT. 99 (1969). In contrast, the rather similar
"entropy" measure of concentration, see Finkelstein & Friedberg, The Application of an Entropy
Theory of Concentration to the Clayton Act, 76 YALE L.J. 677 (1967), lacks a theoretical rationale.
G. SroLEs, supra at 33; Stigler, Comment, 76 YALE L.J. 718 (1967).
iii. See G. STIGLER, supra note 31, at 55.
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percent of the sales, unless the merger put the market across the threshold.
But that would mean that in a market composed of two very large firms,
each with a market share of 2o percent, and a scattering of much smaller
firms, a merger of the two leaders would be insulated from challenge. In
contrast, if the threshold were o.i Herfindahl, small mergers in such a
market would escape scrutiny but not a merger of the two leading firms,
since it would raise the Herfindahl index to above o.16.
I am less concerned with proposing exact figures than with asserting
two principles: first, that the Herfindahl measure seems more appropriate
than four- or eight-firm concentration ratios as a measure of concentration,
and second, that one function of merger guidelines should be to delineate
as clearly as possible the class of horizontal mergers that will not be challenged. The second principle can be extended to define a class of mergers
that will automatically be challenged. For example, the Guidelines might
provide that in any market in which the Herfindahl measure exceeded 0.2
any merger that increased the measure by at least 0.04 Herfindahl would
An example of the operation of this rule is given in the
be challenged.
112
margin.
This approach again leaves a middle area where uncertainty is unavoidable, unless one prefers to be extremely arbitrary. In this middle area it is
appropriate to go beyond market-share percentages and consider several
other dimensions of market structure that bear on the likelihood of successful price-fixing. One is the absolute number of sellers. Collusion is more
difficult in a market that has a large number of sellers than in one with
relatively few, even if the additional sellers are too small to have much
effect on concentration ratios or the Herfindahl measure. This is because
it will normally be impractical to include the many small sellers in the
cartel, and they will be tempted to expand their market positions at the
expense of the major sellers if the latter, through collusion, raise their
prices above the competitive level. Another pertinent factor is the level of
concentration on the buying side of the market. The more concentrated the
buying side is, the less likely is successful collusion by the sellers. A third
factor is the homogeneity of the product. Cheating is hard to detect in the
case of a nonstandardized product. A fourth is the history of collusion in
the market. If a market has a history of section i violations, concern with
further increases in concentration becomes more than theoretical.1
112. Suppose a market consisting of five firms with the following market shares: s 1 = 40%,
5
s-=30%, s-=2o%, s4=8%, and s5=2%. Then H=s2+s2+s2+s
5 +s:', or 0.2968. Now
and (sz +-s,)'
suppose that the second and fourth firms merge. Now H = si + (s2 + s4) + ss,
= s2 -+ 2ss, + s4. Thus, the increase in the Herfindahl measure as the result of a merger is twice the
product of the market shares of the merging firms, or in our example 0.0480. The new Herflndahl
measure is 0.2968 + 0.0480, or 0.3448.
113. These factors are discussed in G. SrnGLER, supra note 31, at 39762, 300.
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One could enumerate other considerations that are relevant to the feasibility of collusion, but a desire to keep enforcement of section 7 as simple
as possible prompts me to exclude factors that may be difficult to measure
(such as the condition of entry or the economies of scale) or whose significance is unclear (such as a previous trend toward concentration, or a
shift in rank among the leading firms). The included factors are both
clearly material to the likelihood of successful collusion and relatively
easy to measure. The number of sellers in the relevant market can easily
be counted; it should be possible to estimate the concentration on the buying side; it should not be too difficult to classify products along a spectrum
between the highly customized and the completely standardized (even as
to credit, delivery, and other terms of sale); and the record of previous
section i violations in an industry can be compiled very easily. The weight
to be given these factors in comparison to various levels of concentration
between the lower and upper thresholds will require an exercise of judgment in each case, but the gain in discriminating enforcement should outweigh the slight loss in certainty." 4
A word, in closing, on the defense of efficiencies in a section 7 proceeding. The Guidelines reject any such defense,"' and I am broadly sympathetic to this approach."' A merger may, to be sure, enable the merging
firms to achieve economies of scale, or facilitate the replacement of inferior
by superior management, although, since there are a number of other possible motivations for mergers, no general presumption that mergers promote efficiency can be indulged. The difficulty, one discussed earlier in a
I14. Other provisions of the Guidelines are relevant to the control of oligopoly, in particular those
relating to potential competition. See Department of Justice Merger Guidelines, i TRADF REG. REP.
443o, at 6687-88 (1968). One who accepts that a highly concentrated market structure fosters collusion will desire to preserve potential competition both as a limitation on anticompetitive behavior
by the firms in such markets and as a source of new competitors who by entering such markets would
reduce concentration in them. The Guidelines accordingly provide that a merger between a leading
firm in a concentrated market and "one of the most likely entrants" into the market is forbidden, with
the class of "most likely entrants" to be delineated in each case by reference to the natural expansion
patterns of firms, their financial resources, and so forth. Id. I have no objection in principle to this
approach, but am troubled by two features of it. First, the Department has failed to confine its attention to those markets sufficiently concentrated to create a plausible danger of tacit collusion. I have
discussed that point in the horizontal context and will not pursue it here. Second, if the class of most
likely entrants contains more than a few firms, the elimination of one is unlikely to affect materially
the effectiveness of potential competition or the likelihood of actual entry. This qualification is absent
from the Guidelines.
115. Department of Justice Merger Guidelines, s TsAin RFo. REP. T 443o, at 6684-85 (1968).
s6. As I have argued elsewhere, however, there should be an exception (perhaps it is implicit in
the Guidelines' reference to "exceptional circumstances" in which a defense of efficiencies may be accepted) for the situation in which a market is a natural monopoly, that is, incapable of efficiently supporting more than one firm. See Posner, supra note 95, at 586-87 (1969). If, the merger route blocked,
the firms in such a market compete vigorously, all but one-by definition-will fail. Competition is so
dangerous a strategy in these circumstances for most of the participants that they will be strongly
motivated to collude rather than compete; and since there are unlikely to be more than a very few
firms in a market that is a natural monopoly, conditions may be highly favorable for collusion in a
form difficult to detect. These unusual circumstances warrant, in my judgment, an exception to the
general policy of refusing to entertain defenses based on the alleged efficiencies that a merger will
confer.
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slightly different context, 17 is in measuring efficiency. That difficulty is

aggravated in the present context by the fact that, since firms can grow and
change other than by merger, the effect of blocking a merger that would

increase efficiency is ordinarily at most to postpone rather than to preclude
altogether the achievement of the efficiencies in question. To determine the

cost of blocking the merger would require, therefore, a determination not
only of the magnitude of the efficiencies that it would produce but also the
probable interval of time before they would be realized in any event. Until
there is better evidence that these are tractable inquiries, there is much to be

said for excluding them from section 7 proceedings."1 That is not an optimum solution, for its consequence is that section 7 enforcement may involve
social costs of unknown dimensions. Perhaps the best that can be done, in

the present state of our understanding, is to disallow the defense

9

but at

the same time reduce the prohibitory scope of the statute to realistic limits
and thereby minimize the occasions on which enforcement may impede

the achievement of efficiencies. That is the course advocated here.
CONCLUSION

The supposed inadequacy of section i of the Sherman Act to deal effectively with noncompetitive pricing by oligopolists has been a persistent
theme in discussions of antitrust policy and a fertile source of proposals
for new legislation and new applications of other antitrust provisions.
This view of section I is rooted in the theory that noncompetitive pricing
is virtually inevitable in a market having an oligopolistic market structure
and hence not amenable to rules and remedies concerned with altering behavior without changing structure, and perhaps also in a lawyers' habit in
applying section i of looking for evidence of actual agreement rather than
for evidence of effects on competition. I have argued that noncompetitive
pricing by oligopolists is not compelled, although it is facilitated, by the
structure of the market. It is a variant of conventional cartel behavior, and
there is a good chance that it can be controlled effectively by proceedings
under section I. Revision of section i to improve the penalties for violation,
and improvements in economic knowledge to facilitate the drawing of inferences of collusion from observed firm behavior, would greatly assist but
do not seem absolutely essential to this employment of section I.
117. See note 86 supra. The discussion in that note concerns the difficulty of determining efficient
scale. I have discussed elsewhere some of the difficulties involved in determining managerial efficiency.
See Posner, supra note 95, at 628-3o.
i18. And, a fortiori, for not attempting to balance the efficiency gains of a merger against its welfare losses (see note 103 supra)-anotherfactor normally impossible to quantify-as proposed in Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Tradeoffs, 58 Am. Eco8. Rav. 18 (1968).
tu9. With the exception noted in note ix6supra.
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Analysis of the basic question-the applicability of the traditional remedies against cartelization to noncompetitive pricing by oligopolists-led to
a critical examination of other proposals for dealing with the problem. In
general, these proposals, which involve the dismemberment of existing oligopolies and extremely stringent prohibitions against horizontal mergers,
were found to be unduly severe. I ventured the suggestion that restructuring markets by breaking up existing firms can rarely be justified as sound
antitrust policy. In the matter of prophylactic remedies, the approach in the
Department of Justice Merger Guidelines of making market-share percentages the primary test of when to challenge a horizontal merger seems
basically sound. However, the definition of market requires revision; the
Guidelines should delineate a class of mergers that the Department will not
challenge; a different measure of concentration should be employed; and
the test of whether to challenge a merger should be broadened, in a middle
range of cases, to include a few readily determinable factors in addition to
market shares that analysis of oligopoly indicates to be relevant to predicting noncompetitive pricing. These factors are the absolute number of
sellers in the market, the concentration on the buying side, the degree of
standardization of the product, and the history of collusive activities in the
market.
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